GLOBAL CITIES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF  CLIMATE CHANGE:  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF  LAW IN CITIES? by Schroeder, Heike & Bulkeley, Harriet
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 36 | Number 2 Article 3
2009
GLOBAL CITIES AND THE GOVERNANCE
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT IS THE
ROLE OF LAW IN CITIES?
Heike Schroeder
University of Oxfor
Harriet Bulkeley
Department of Geography at Durham University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heike Schroeder and Harriet Bulkeley, GLOBAL CITIES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT IS THE
ROLE OF LAW IN CITIES?, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 313 (2009).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol36/iss2/3
SCHROEDER_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/21/2009 3:30:44 PM 
 
313 
GLOBAL CITIES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE:  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF 
LAW IN CITIES? 
Heike Schroeder and Harriet Bulkeley∗ 
Introduction ...............................................................................................314 
I.  Urban Climate Governance ...................................................................316 
A. International Context ...............................................................316 
B. Local Government and Climate Governance in the United 
Kingdom..................................................................................319 
C. Local Government and Climate Governance in the United 
States........................................................................................325 
II.  Climate Policy and Action in London..................................................331 
A. London’s Socio-Economic and Environmental Profile ...........331 
B. Competencies and Powers for Climate Governance in 
London.....................................................................................334 
C. The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in London ..............336 
D. Climate Governance in Action ................................................339 
III.  Climate Policy and Action in Los Angeles.........................................342 
A. Los Angeles’s Socio-Economic and Environmental Profile ...342 
B. Competencies and Powers for Climate Governance in Los 
Angeles ....................................................................................343 
C. The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in Los Angeles.......344 
D. Climate Governance in Action ................................................348 
IV.  Comparing London and Los Angeles:  Modes of Governing and 
the Role of Law ..............................................................................352 
A. Self-Governing ........................................................................353 
B. Control and Compliance..........................................................354 
C. Provision..................................................................................356 
D. Enabling...................................................................................358 
E. Summary..................................................................................359 
Conclusion .................................................................................................360 
 
∗ Heike Schroeder is a Tyndall Research Fellow at the Environmental Change Institute of 
the University of Oxford.  Harriet Bulkeley is a Reader in the Department of Geography at 
Durham University.  The authors would like to recognize Daniela Rey and the participants 
of the Cooper-Walsh Symposium for comments on an earlier draft. 
SCHROEDER_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/21/2009  3:30:44 PM 
314 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
INTRODUCTION 
Cities are increasingly recognized as significant producers and able 
managers of carbon emission.1  They have become the predominant source 
of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions—perhaps as much as 70% by 
some accounts2—and places where vulnerability to climate change may be 
acute.  For the world’s major cities, climate change is therefore becoming 
an issue of increasing political and environmental significance.  But how 
cities go about addressing the issue of climate change is not yet well under-
stood.  The competency and capacity of local government to address a 
multi-layered environmental problem such as climate change is largely de-
termined by the legal structures within which it is embedded, but also by 
factors such as critical individuals, past successes, business consensus, pub-
lic opinion, market opportunities, and environmental advocacy.3 
Climate change policy at national and international levels has developed 
significantly over the past two decades.  In 1992, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted at the Rio Summit 
with countries pledging to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system” and to inventory and report on their greenhouse 
gas (“GHG”) emissions.4  In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol established manda-
 
 1. HARRIET BULKELEY & MICHELE M. BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE:  URBAN 
SUSTAINABILITY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 2 (2003) [hereinafter BULKE-
LEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE]; Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, 
Looking Back and Thinking Ahead:  A Decade of Cities and Climate Change Research, 12 
LOC. ENV’T 448 (2007) [hereinafter Betsill & Bulkeley, Looking Back]. 
 2. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE STERN REVIEW 221 
(2006).  This is a commonly cited figure but it is argued that the level of city-based emis-
sions will be much lower depending on which GHGs are included and whether emissions 
are counted at the stage of production or consumption.  See David Satterthwaite, Cities’ 
Contribution to Global Warming:  Notes on the Allocation of Greenhouse Gas, 20 ENV’T & 
URBANIZATION 540 (2008). 
 3. See Harriet Bulkeley & Heike Schroeder, Governing Climate Change Post-2012:  
The Role of Global Cities—London Case-Study (Tyndall Ctr. for Climate Change Research, 
Working Paper No. 123, 2008) [hereinafter Bulkeley & Schroeder, Governing Climate 
Change:  London], available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/ 
twp123.pdf; Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change Post-2012:  
The Role of Global Cities—Los Angeles Case-Study (Tyndall Ctr. for Climate Change Re-
search, Working Paper No. 122, 2008) [hereinafter Schroeder & Bulkeley, Governing Cli-
mate Change:  Los Angeles], available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_ 
papers/twp122.pdf. 
 4. Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:  
A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 455 (1993) (quoting United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development:  Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
in INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMM. FOR A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE APR. 30-MAY 9, 1992, REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATION COM-
MITTEE FOR A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND 
PART OF ITS FIFTH SESSION, U.N. Doc. A/AC237/18 (Oct. 16, 1992). 
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tory targets for industrialized countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases by 2008 through 2012, along with a range of economic instruments 
designed to assist with this goal.5  Over the past decade, negotiations have 
continued as the economic instruments of the Kyoto Protocol, including the 
Clean Development Mechanism, Emissions Trading, and Joint Implemen-
tation, were finalized.6  Although not all countries are on track to meet their 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol—and the United States remains outside of 
it—negotiations are now under way to develop a “post-2012” agreement.7  
To date, most analysis has focused on the role of nation-states in the de-
sign, promotion, and implementation of various “post-2012” policy archi-
tectures and instruments.  A growing body of literature is pointing to the 
emergence of a range of non-nation state actors, such as multinational 
companies, carbon trading and offset organizations, and global cities, that 
have entered this policy arena and have developed their own initiatives and 
approaches to addressing this issue.8 
This Article examines how global cities are governing climate change.  
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the national and international 
contexts of urban climate governance focusing on the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  Parts II and III analyze London and Los Angeles, repec-
tively, as examples of global cities.  They provide a thorough examination 
of climate change policies and actions in these two cities, based on ap-
proximately thirty in-depth interviews with government, business and civil 
society representatives during 2007-08, as well as official documents and 
grey literature.  Part IV then examines the modes of governance to under-
stand what role law plays in urban efforts to mitigate climate change. 
I.  URBAN CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
The development of an explicitly urban approach to climate change gov-
ernance owes much to the emergence of transnational municipal networks 
 
 5. HEIKE SCHROEDER, NEGOTIATING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:  AN ANALYSIS OF NEGO-
TIATION DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 90 (2001). 
 6. FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE RE-
GIME:  A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES (2001). 
 7. Raymond Clémençon, The Bali Roadmap:  A First Step on the Difficult Journey to a 
Post-Kyoto Protocol Agreement, 17 J. ENV’T & DEV. 71 (2008). 
 8. Heather Lovell et al., Carbon Offsetting:  Sustaining Consumption?, 41 ENV’T & 
PLAN. 90 (2009); Chukwumerije Okereke et al., Conceptualizing Climate Governance be-
yond the International Regime, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 58 (2009); Chukwumerije Okereke, 
An Exploration of Motivations, Drivers and Barriers to Carbon Management:  The UK 
FTSE 100, 25 EUR. MGMT. J. 475 (2007); Harriet Bulkeley & Heike Schroeder, Beyond 
State/Non-State Divides:  Global Cities and the Governing of Climate Change (unpublished 
maunscript, on file with authors). 
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focused specifically on this issue in the early 1990s.9  Since the early-
2000s, these networks have evolved to become both more comprehensive 
and more politically significant, particularly with the development of the 
C40 network of global cities.10  They have provided municipalities with in-
spiration, concrete projects, access to funding, examples of best practices, 
and informal structures of recognition and reward which have led to a sig-
nificant response from municipalities worldwide.11 
A. International Context 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of cities, primarily in North 
America and Europe, began to adopt targets and timetables for reducing 
their emissions of GHGs.12  These efforts became organized internationally 
through the formation of three transnational municipal networks: Cities for 
Climate Protection (“CCP”),13 Climate Alliance,14 and Energie-Cités.15  
CCP was formed in 1992 as an initiative of the International Council for 
Local Environmental Initiatives (“ICLEI”).  ICLEI first became involved 
with municipal climate policy through the Urban CO2 Reduction Project,16 
which ran from 1991 to 1993 and was funded by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, the City of Toronto, and several private foundations.17  
Municipal membership of the CCP network initially reflected these origins 
with a concentration of members from North America and Europe, but has 
since expanded with specific campaigns in Australia, Canada, Europe, 
Latin America, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, South Asia, Southeast 
 
 9. Michele Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Transnational Networks and Global 
Environmental Governance:  The Cities for Climate Protection Program, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 
472 (2004). 
 10. See C40 Cities:  An Introduction, http://www.c40cities.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 
2009). 
 11. Betsill & Bulkeley, Looking Back, supra note 1, at 449. 
 12. BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1; Hari M. Osofsky 
& Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?:  Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 409 (2008) [hereinafter Osofsky & Levit, Scale of Networks?]. 
 13. See ICLEI.org, Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), http://www.iclei.org/index.php? 
id=800 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
 14. See The Climate Alliance of European Cities, http://www.climateforchange.net/ 
23.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
 15. See Energie-Cites.eu, http://www.energie-cites.eu/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 16. Fourteen municipalities from North America and Europe participated in the Urban 
CO2 Reduction Project:  Ankara, Turkey; Bologna, Italy; Chula Vista, U.S.; Copenhagen, 
Denmark; Dade County, U.S.; Denver, U.S.; Hanover, Germany; Helsinki, Finland; Min-
neapolis, U.S.; Portland, U.S.; Saarbrücken, Germany; Saint Paul, U.S.; and Toronto, Can-
ada.  Michelle Betsill, Mitigating Climate Change in US Cities:  Opportunities and Obsta-
cles, 6 LOC. ENV’T 393, 405 (2001). 
 17. BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 51. 
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Asia, and the United States.18  CCP members pledge to reduce their emis-
sions of greenhouse gases by between 10-20% from 1990 levels by 2010; 
member cities are now thought to account for 15% of world urban emis-
sions.19  The Climate Alliance has 1,100 members in seventeen European 
countries, with the aim to reduce emissions to 50% below 1990 levels by 
2030.  The network is based in Frankfurt am Main and most of its members 
are located in continental Europe (Germany, Austria and the Nether-
lands).20  Energie-Cités stemmed from a project funded by the EU Com-
mission and is a somewhat different network, with an explicit focus on lo-
cal energy policy in which addressing climate change is only one factor.  
Founded in 1990 and based in France, it now has over 160 individual 
members in twenty-five European countries, with a concentration in fran-
cophone nations.21 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, urban governance on climate change 
was primarily orchestrated through these three networks.  In the mid-2000s, 
a new wave of transnational municipal networks emerged.  The first of 
these was the 2005 United States Conference of Mayors Climate Protection 
Agreement,22 in which cities pledged “to meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol 
targets in their own communities.”23  ICLEI has since supported the devel-
opment of the World Mayors Council on Climate Change with the explicit 
purpose “to politically promote climate protection policies at the local 
level.”24  In the case of the global cities discussed this Article, the emer-
gence of the C40 network has been a critical development.25  This network 
was promoted by the Mayor of London and The Climate Group and formed 
by eighteen cities in 2005 as a parallel initiative to the Group of Eight 
(“G8”) Gleneagles summit on climate change.26  In 2006, the C40 network 
 
 18. See ICLEI.org, CCP Participants, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=809 (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2009) 
 19. See ICLEI.org, How It Started?, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=811 (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2009). 
 20. Kristine Kern & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Govern-
ance:  Governing Climate Change Through Transnational Municipal Networks, 47 J. COM-
MON MARKET STUD. 7, 7 n.5 (2009) [hereinafter Kern & Bulkeley, Cities]. 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. See Seattle.gov., United States Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, http:// 
www.seattle.gov/mayor/climate/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See CCP Europe Campaign, http://www.iclei-europe.org/?ccpeurope (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2009); ICLEI.org, World Mayors Council on Climate Change, http://www.iclei.org/ 
index.php?id=7192 (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 25. See C40 Cities:  An Introduction, supra note 10. 
 26. See The Climate Group, World Cities Leadership Climate Change Summit, http:// 
www.theclimategroup.org/news_and_events/world_cities_leadership_climate_change_sum
mit/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
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entered into a partnership with the Clinton Climate Initiative and expanded 
its membership to include forty of the largest cities in the world and 
changed its name to the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.27 
In December 2007, local government representatives met in Bali, Indo-
nesia during COP-13 to convene a two-day conference during which they 
adopted a World Mayors and Local Governments Climate Protection 
Agreement.28  The agreement is loosely modeled on the United States Con-
ference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement and sets forth six com-
mitments that are more explicit than those upon which country delegates 
were able to agree in the international negotiations.  The first commitment 
calls on local governments to “REDUCE greenhouse gas emissions imme-
diately and significantly.  Measure and report on annual reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions and constantly work to increase reductions such 
that by 2050 greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced worldwide by 60% 
from 1990 levels and by 80% from 1990 levels in industrialized coun-
tries.”29  ICLEI also sent a delegation larger than any single country and 
second only to the delegation representing trade interests under the Interna-
tional Emissions Trading Association.30 
 
 27. See C40 Cities, History of the C40, http://www.c40cities.org/about (last visited Feb. 
9, 2009). 
 28. See ICLEI.org, Local Government–Local Solutions, http://www.iclei.org/index.php? 
id=7127 (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 29. See World Mayors and Local Governments Climate Protection Agreement, 
http://www.globalclimateagreement.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).  The other five com-
mitments are: 
- IMPLEMENT subnational, national and international frameworks that are com-
plementary and enable local governments by providing resources, authority and 
sufficient mandate to carry forward these roles and responsibilities. 
- BUILD a sustainable energy economy through energy savings and the 
application of new and existing renewable and high efficiency technologies, to 
reduce dependence on fossil and nuclear fuels and aim for lowest-carbon options. 
- EXECUTE climate change adaptation and preparedness measures through local 
government planning, development and operational mechanisms, prioritizing the 
most vulnerable cities. 
- ADVOCATE that every national delegation participating in the UNFCCC 
negotiations include local government designated representation to ensure that 
local climate priorities and actions are included in future negotiations. 
- PERSISTENTLY CALL for national governments to join the international 
community to undertake binding carbon limits to rapidly and significantly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the short-term and by at least 60% worldwide below 
1990 levels by 2050. 
Id. 
 30. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the 
Parties, 13th Sess., Bali, Indon., Dec. 3-14, 2007, List of Participants, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/INF.1 (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/ 
cop13/eng/inf01p02.pdf.  While there were 3516 registered participants from parties and 
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As this brief history suggests, there is a growing movement internation-
ally for urban responses to climate change.  These networks have provided 
municipalities with inspiration, concrete projects, access to funding, exam-
ples of best practices, and informal structures of recognition and reward 
which have led to a significant response from municipalities worldwide.31  
The extent to which municipal governments are able to address climate 
change, however, also depends on their competencies in this area, and it is 
to the role of local government in climate governance in the United King-
dom and the United States that we now turn. 
B. Local Government and Climate Governance in the United 
Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the relationship between central government and 
local authorities is governed by the legal principle of ultra vires: “local 
councils have been able to do only what they are statutorily permitted to 
do.  Their rights and competences are not general, but specific.”32 “The 
statutory duties set by central government can be compulsory . . . dictating 
the activities local authorities must undertake, or discretionary, allowing for 
flexibility in the priority given to different measures and the ways in which 
they are implemented.”33  Nonetheless, local government in the United 
Kingdom enjoys some financial independence.  The mixture of specific 
competences and local discretion has led some commentators to argue that 
local government in the United Kingdom enjoys “partial autonomy.”34  
 
observer states there was a total of 4993 registered participants from non-governmental or-
ganizations.  By comparison, at COP-12 the number of participants was 2352 and 2533, re-
spectively, and at COP-8 in 2002 the number of participants was 1468 and 1858, respec-
tively.  See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the 
Parties, 12th Sess., Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 6-17, 2006, List of Participants, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2006/INF.1 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
2006/cop12/eng/inf01.pdf; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Conference of the Parties, 8th Sess., New Delhi, India, Oct. 23–Nov. 1, 2002, List of Par-
ticipants, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2002/INF.2 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/cop8/inf02.pdf; see also Heather Lovell, More Effective, Efficient and Faster?  
The Role of Non-State Actors at UN Climate Negotiations (Tyndall Ctr. for Climate Change 
Research, Tyndall Briefing Note No. 24, 2007). 
 31. See Betsill & Bulkeley, Looking Back, supra note 1.  For example, ICLEI Australia 
suggests that between 1997-98 and 2007-08, Australian councils have reduced CO2 emis-
sions by over 18 million tons.  See ICLEI.org, CCP Australia; Greenhouse Savings, http:// 
www.iclei.org/index.php?id=2291 (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (scroll down to greenhouse 
savings heading). 
 32. DAVID WILSON & CHRIS GAME, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 27 
(2002). 
 33. BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 59. 
 34. WILSON & GAME, supra note 32, at 28-29; see also Kern & Bulkeley, Cities, supra 
note 20. 
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While the Greater London Authority (“GLA”), the level of government re-
sponsible for metropolitan climate policy, is not constituted as a local au-
thority but rather as a devolved administration, the competencies and pow-
ers are similar to those of local authorities in the climate change area.35 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, this partial autonomy was evident in 
relation to urban climate change policy.  Despite the lack of any explicit 
statutory duties to address climate change, local authorities in the United 
Kingdom had various duties that related to climate protection.  Following 
the 1995 Home Energy Conservation Act, local authorities had a duty to 
report on the energy efficiency standards of their housing stock and the 
ability to take measures to improve it.36  The introduction of Best Value 
Performance Indicators in the late 1990s included an indicator for energy 
use in council buildings, as well as statutory targets for increasing the recy-
cling and composting of waste.37  National guidance on Local Transport 
Plans and in the form of Planning Policy Statements also provided scope 
for addressing emissions of greenhouse gases through improving the en-
ergy efficiency of new developments, reducing the need to travel and en-
couraging the development of renewable energy.38  In addition, through the 
Transport Act 2000, local authorities were given the powers to implement 
congestion and workplace charging schemes.39  Exercise of this power has 
been very limited, with congestion charging confined to London and a 
small scheme in Durham, in the north-east of England.  At the same time as 
fulfilling these duties, there is a high level of discretion for local authorities 
in interpreting government guidance and the new duty of “well being,” in-
 
 35. See generally Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Greater London Authority:  Devolution or 
Administrative Decentralization?, Address at Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association (Aug. 28, 2003). 
 36. Emma Jones & Matthew Leach, Devolving Residential Energy Efficiency Responsi-
bility to Local Government:  The Case of HECA, 5 LOC. ENV’T 69, 72 (2000). 
 37. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, BEST VALUE PERFORMANCE INDICA-
TORS:  2005/06, at 9 (2004), available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/ 
localgovernment/bestvalueperformance (follow “Best Value Performance Indicators 
2005/06:  Guidance Document” hyperlink). 
 38. Harriet Bulkeley, Planning and the Governance of Climate Change, in PLANNING 
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE:  STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION FOR SPATIAL PLAN-
NERS (S. Davoudi & J. Crawford eds.) (forthcoming 2009); Harriet Bulkeley & Michele M. 
Betsill, Rethinking Sustainable Cities:  Multilevel Governance and the “Urban” Politics of 
Climate Change, 14 ENV’L POL. 42 (2005) [hereinafter Bulkeley & Betsill, Rethinking Sus-
tainable Cities]; D. McEvoy et al., Reducing Residential Carbon Intensity:  The New Role 
for English Local Authorities, 38 URB. STUD. 7 (2001). 
 39. See LOCAL GOV’T ASS’N, CUTTING THROUGH THE GREEN TAPE:  THE POWERS COUN-
CILS HAVE TO TACKLE CLIMATE CHANGE 24 (2008) [hereinafter LGA, CUTTING THROUGH 
THE GREEN TAPE], available at http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/publications/publication-
display.do?id=874295. 
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troduced in the Local Government Act 2000, allows local governments to 
pursue any activities which they consider will promote the economic, so-
cial, or environmental well-being of their areas, both of which provide mu-
nicipal government with considerable scope to implement climate policy. 
In the absence of central government direction, however, specific cli-
mate protection strategies per se have historically been rare.  Some local 
authorities, including Cambridgeshire, Kirklees, Leicester, Newcastle, and 
Southampton, developed energy or climate change strategies in the early 
1990s.40  It was following the CCP-UK pilot,41 and the subsequent devel-
opment of the Nottingham Declaration in 200042, however, that local au-
thorities in the United Kingdom began to develop systematic climate 
change action plans.  Since 2000, over 300 local authorities have signed the 
Nottingham Declaration,43 and municipal interest and innovation in urban 
climate change governance has increased.  This has, in part, resulted from 
increasing direction from national government to local authorities in the 
arena of climate policy, as well as a growing interest among a number of 
national climate change related agencies (for example, the Energy Savings 
Trust and the Carbon Trust) in the role of local government.44  This has 
been most notable in the area of land-use planning.  Planning Policy State-
ment 1 (“PPS1”), published in 2005, provides the framework for spatial 
planning in the United Kingdom and specifically states that: 
Regional planning bodies and local planning authorities should ensure 
that development plans contribute to global sustainability by addressing 
 
 40. Harriet Bulkeley & Kristine Kern, Local Government and Climate Change Govern-
ance in the UK and Germany, 43 URB. STUD. 2237, 2239 (2006) [hereinafter Bulkeley & 
Kern, Local Government]; see generally BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE, supra note 1, at 70-121; Lee Allman et al., The Progress of English and Welsh Lo-
cal Authorities in Addressing Climate Change, 9 LOC. ENV’T 271 (2004). 
 41. The CCP-UK initiative was a U.K. pilot of the ICLEI’s  Cities for Climate Protec-
tion program, and was organized by the Improvement and Development Agency (“IDeA”) 
in conjunction with ICLEI Europe, and funded by IDeA and the Department for Environ-
ment, Transport, and the Regions (“DEFRA”).  The pilot involved twenty-four local au-
thorities over a period of almost two years.  A “roll out” of the pilot, a scheme to involve 
more local authorities in reducing their own in-house emissions of greenhouse gases by 5%, 
is being developed by the Carbon Trust in consultation with ICLEI.  Bulkeley & Kern, Lo-
cal Government, supra note 40, at 2255. 
 42. See The Nottingham Declaration, http://www.iclei-europe.org/fileadmin/user_ 
upload/ITC/nottingham2005/Nottingham_Declaration__current.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 
2009) (commiting signatories to addressing the causes and consequences of climate change). 
 43. See The Nottingham Declaration on Climate Change, Who Has Signed?, http:// 
www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/nottingham/Nottingham-Declaration/Why-Sign/Who-has-
signed (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 44. See, e.g., The Nottingham Declaration Partners, http://www.energysavingtrust.org. 
uk/nottingham/Nottingham-Declaration/Why-Sign/The-Nottingham-Declaration-Partners 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
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the causes and potential impacts of climate change—through policies 
which reduce energy use, reduce emissions (for example, by encouraging 
patterns of development which reduce the need to travel by private car, or 
reduce the impact of moving freight), promote the development of renew-
able energy resources, and take climate change impacts into account in 
the location and design of development.45 
Previous planning guidance suggested that the potential for regions to 
mitigate climate change and their vulnerability to impacts should be “con-
sidered,”46 or that planners should “promote the energy efficiency of new 
housing where possible.”47  However, the language of PPS1 is clearer:  
planning bodies and authorities need to ensure that both the causes and im-
pacts of climate change are addressed.48  Local authorities have also been 
proactive in this area.  In 2004, following the publication of national plan-
ning guidance on renewable energy, the London Borough of Merton intro-
duced a target for all major new developments (those comprising over ten 
dwellings or 1000m² of non-residential development) of providing 10% of 
energy use through on-site renewable energy generation to reduce their 
emissions of carbon dioxide.  The “Merton Rule” has now been adopted, in 
some form, by thirty-four local governments in the United Kingdom with a 
further sixty-three “actively progressing” its use.49  In 2007, a supplemen-
tary planning policy statement, Planning and Climate Change has been 
published.50  Here, the role of spatial planning in addressing climate change 
is seen to be five-fold: 
secure enduring progress against the United Kingdom’s emissions targets 
. . . deliver the Government’s ambition of zero carbon development . . . 
shape sustainable communities that are resilient to and appropriate for the 
climate change now accepted as inevitable . . . create an attractive envi-
ronment for innovation and for the private sector to bring forward invest-
 
 45. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, PLANNING POLICY STATEMENT 1:  DELIVER-
ING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6 (2005), available at http://www.communities.gov 
.uk/planningandbuilding/planning/planningpolicyguidance/planningpolicystatements/ 
planningpolicystatements/pps1/ (emphasis added). 
 46. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, THE PLANNING RESPONSE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE:  ADVICE ON BETTER PRACTICE 24, 25, 62 (2004), available at www.communities. 
gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/147597.pdf. 
 47. DEP’T FOR ENV’T, TRANSP. & THE REGIONS, PLANNING POLICY GUIDANCE 3:  HOUS-
ING, HMSO, LONDON 3 (2000). 
 48. Harriet Bulkeley, A Changing Climate for Spatial Planning? (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
 49. See Themertonrule.org, List of Boroughs, http://www.themertonrule.org/list-of-
boroughs (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 50. DEP’T FOR COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, PLANNING POLICY STATEMENT:  PLAN-
NING AND CLIMATE CHANGE, SUPPLEMENT TO PLANNING POLICY STATEMENT 1 (2007). 
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ment . . . capture local enthusiasm and give local communities a real op-
portunity to influence, and take, action on climate change.51 
Interestingly, this guidance points not only to the regulatory role of 
planning, but also to its potential in engaging and enabling others—notably 
the private sector and “communities.”  This discourse reflects what some 
commentators have termed a transition from “a unitary to a multiple system 
for governing local communities—from local government to local govern-
ance.”52  During the 1990s, “local authorities became less extensively in-
volved in the direct provision of education, housing, public transport, social 
and other services.  Instead, they increasingly ‘enabled’ other agencies, the 
voluntary sector and the private sector to provide these services.”53  This 
approach to local government is also reflected in the development of Local 
Strategic Partnerships (“LSPs”), sustainable community strategies, and Lo-
cal Area Agreements (“LAAs”) as the vehicles through which local policy 
and action are mandated.54  Through successive Local Government Acts 
during the 2000s, the Labour Administration has bought forward a system 
in which LSPs, consisting of local government and other stakeholders, de-
velop both a sustainable community strategy and a set of up to thirty-five 
priorities and targets from a set of 198 indicators as a focus for local action, 
which are formalized in an agreement with national government known as 
an LAA.  Of the 198 indicators, five relate to addressing climate change:55 
185: CO2 reduction from local authority operations 
186: per captia reductions of CO2 emissions in the local authority area 
187: tackling fuel poverty - % of people receiving income based benefits 
living in homes with a low energy efficiency rating 
188: planning to adapt to climate change 
189: flood and costal erosion risk management56 
 
 51. Id. at 9. 
 52. C. Skelcher, Governing Communities:  Parish-Pump Politics or Strategic Partner-
ships?, 29 LOC. GOV’T STUD. 9 (2003). 
 53. ROBERT LEACH & JANIE PERCY-SMITH, LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN BRITAIN 29 (2001). 
 54. LOCAL GOV’T ASS’N, LOCAL AREA AGREEMENTS—COMMUNICATING LOCAL PRIORI-
TIES, COMMUNICATIONS TOOLKIT 2008 [hereinafter LGA, LOCAL AREA AGREEMENTS], 
http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/791870. 
 55. DEP’T FOR COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T, NATIONAL INDICATORS FOR LOCAL AU-
THORITIES AND LOCAL AUTHORITY PARTNERSHIPS:  HANDBOOK OF DEFINITIONS 13-15 (2008), 
available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/localgovernment/finalnational 
indicators. 
 56. Id. 
SCHROEDER_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/21/2009  3:30:44 PM 
324 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
Significantly, in a survey of the most frequently selected priorities for 
the first round of LAA (2008-2011), the Local Government Association 
found that reducing CO2 emissions was the fifth most selected performance 
indicator (selected in 100 out of the total 150 LAA), ranking above issues 
such as reducing childhood obesity, crime, educational attainment, and cul-
tural cohesion.57  While this is a significant indicator of the current impor-
tance attached to local government responses to climate change, it remains 
to be seen how authorities will fare in actually seeking to achieve this goal 
in the short and long term. 
The overall picture of competencies for addressing climate change 
among United Kingdom  local authorities is a complex one.  On the one 
hand, central government has become increasingly involved in “directing” 
local government in this area, particularly through new planning guidance 
and national performance indicators.  On the other hand, these remain areas 
for local government discretion—there is no statutory responsibility to fol-
low this guidance—and there is also considerable scope for local govern-
ment to act on climate change through other means, including through their 
own estate, in arenas of housing and transport policy, and through the in-
creasingly regulated area of biodegradable waste.58  Partial autonomy re-
mains a valid description of the competencies of local government in this 
area, albeit that the increasing political and public salience of the issue has 
led to a greater level of involvement by United Kingdom local authorities 
than was the case in the late 1990s.  At the same time, it is clear that the 
general trend towards a system of “local governance” rather than “govern-
ment” is visible in the urban climate policy arena.  There is emphasis on the 
role of partnerships and community involvement as critical in the develop-
ment and delivery of local climate policy.  At the same time, more tradi-
tional mechanisms of governing “including hierarchical relations between 
the central and local state, service delivery and means of regulation remain 
important.”59  While this context provides considerable scope for urban 
climate governance, it also creates a situation of uncertainty.  The wording 
on a recent document produced by the Local Government Association to 
set out the many possibilities for action on climate change is interesting in 
this regard.  It warns that:  Not all powers are listed, and in some cases the 
powers discussed will only be applicable to certain tiers of government.  It 
 
 57. LGA, LOCAL AREA AGREEMENTS, supra note 54, at 11. 
 58. Harriet Bulkeley et al., Modes of Governing Municipal Waste, 39 ENV’T & PLAN. 
2733 (2007). 
 59. Bulkeley & Kern, Local Government, supra note 40, at 2241. 
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is good practice to check any legal implications have been cleared by your 
legal services.60 
In the context of partial autonomy, legal uncertainties remain as to the 
role and responsibilities of local governments in the United Kingdom  ad-
dressing climate change.  In the case of London, the Greater London Au-
thority (“GLA”) has been charged with a “duty” to address climate change, 
which we set out in further detail below.  The GLA, as a devolved admini-
stration encompassing a regional development agency, however, also has 
an ambiguous, partially autonomous role in addressing climate change.  
Through its planning and strategic policy powers, the GLA is charged with 
following national direction—as set out above—but also has considerable 
independence.  We review this situation in depth in Part II.  Before detail-
ing the case-study, we examine the foundations for municipal climate gov-
ernance in the United States. 
C. Local Government and Climate Governance in the United States 
Local government has no status in the U.S. Constitution, which leaves it 
mainly to the state government to determine the state-local power relation-
ship.61  The doctrine that established state preeminence over local govern-
ments is “Dillon’s rule,” which takes its name from a ruling in 1868 on 
municipal corporations.62  As interpreted by the Supreme Court in 1903, 
the doctrine pronounces that local governments are “mere political subdivi-
sions of the state for the purpose of exercising a part of its powers.”63  
Power has to be expressly granted to them.64  This has happened through 
states amending their constitutions to grant their larger cities “home rule”, 
which is a guarantee of non-interference in certain areas of local affairs.  
These powers and responsibilities can be withdrawn or altered by the states 
at any time.65  Local governments are therefore “mere conveniences of the 
 
 60. LGA, CUTTING THROUGH THE GREEN TAPE, supra note 39, at 5. 
 61. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS:  A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH (2d 
ed. 1995). 
 62. See J. FRED SILVA & ELISA BARBOUR, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, THE 
STATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIP IN CALIFORNIA:  A CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER 
(1999); John G. Grumm & Russell D. Murphy, Dillon’s Rule Reconsidered, 416 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.  120 (1974). 
 63. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220 (1903). 
 64. SILVA & BARBOUR, supra note 62, at 3. 
 65. Lawrence Pratchett, Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the “New Localism”, 
52 POL. STUD. 358, 362 (2004). 
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states”, and are, above all, administratively important in that they imple-
ment the laws of the state.66 
The power of states is significant in the U.S. political system as it is 
based on the principle of federalism, which shares power between natioanl 
and state levels of government.67  This “dual federalism” is historically 
rooted in the fact that at the time of state formation, a number of states had 
already existed as virtually autonomous units under the Articles of the Con-
federation.68  During the first 150 or so years after the Constitution was 
ratified, the states remained more important than the national government 
in that most policies governing U.S. citizens were made by state legisla-
tures, not Congress.69  The tide turned somewhat when the economic pow-
ers of state governments were substantially cut in 1937 after the Supreme 
Court emphasized the national government’s role in interstate commerce at 
the expense of intrastate commerce which had been the responsibility of the 
states.70  It thus enabled the national government to substantially regulate 
local economic affairs.  The Supreme Court also ruled that whenever a state 
law conflicts with a federal law, the state law becomes invalid.71  But even 
though national government powers to regulate the economy expanded af-
ter 1933, the national government did not expand at the expense of the 
states.72 
States control how local governments can raise revenue, which is an im-
portant determinant of what local governments can do regarding climate 
change.  Cities generally raise revenue through property taxes, but they can 
also issue sales taxes.73  In California, the level of local government’s fiscal 
autonomy has changed over time.  Through passage in 1910 of a state bal-
lot measure know as the Separation of Sources Act, local government was 
granted exclusive control over property taxes, which was the main source 
of public revenue at that time.  This doctrine was substantially revoked by 
the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 in California.74  It sets a uniform 
 
 66. THEODORE  J. LOWI & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:  FREEDOM 
AND POWER 49 (5th ed. 1998). 
 67. See generally JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM:  THE 
GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER (1992). 
 68. LOWI & GINSBERG, supra note 66, at 42-43. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937); Leslie Zines, Federal Constitutional 
Power Over the Economy, PUBLIUS, Autumn, 1990, at 19. 
 71. LOWI & GINSBERG, supra note 66, at 45-48. 
 72. Id. 
 73. J. RICHARD ARONSON & JOHN L. HILLEY, BROOKINGS INST., FINANCING STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (4th ed. 1986). 
 74. ELISA BARBOUR, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., STATE-LOCAL FISCAL CONFLICTS IN 
CALIFORNIA:  FROM PROPOSITION 13 TO PROPOSITION 1A (2007). 
SCHROEDER_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/21/2009  3:30:44 PM 
2009] LAW IN GLOBAL CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE 327 
statewide property tax of a maximum of 1% on the home value at the time 
of purchase.  While significantly reducing the financial burden of, espe-
cially old, Californian homeowners, Proposition 13 transferred control over 
property tax allocation from local to state government and stripped local 
government of a significant share of its income.75 
Not only do states control local government finances, the national gov-
ernment also controls those of the state and local governments.  Congress 
provides funds to state and local governments through “grants-in-aid” (later 
called “block grants”) on the condition that they will be spent on a particu-
lar cause specified by Congress.76  For example, Congress sets national 
goals such as public housing and assistance to the unemployed and pro-
vides grants-in-aid to meet these goals.77  The grants-in-aid scheme is a 
way of strategically encouraging state and local governments to pursue na-
tionally defined goals, without commanding and controlling them or pre-
scribing their approach to meeting these goals.  More recently, this scheme 
has transformed somewhat to what has been called “regulated federalism,” 
where national government may threaten to withhold grant money unless 
state and local governments conform to national standards, such as on envi-
ronmental law.78  National government provides grants-in-aid financing but 
sets conditions which its beneficiaries must meet in order to keep the 
grants.  In some cases, it also sets national standards in areas without pro-
viding funding to meet them.79 
Interaction between these levels of government is not always as top-
down as the above may suggest.  States and cities have taken on the issue 
of climate change, filling a policy void at the national level especially after 
the Bush Administration’s withdrawal from the Kyoto process in 2001 and 
ongoing lack of any significant policy response.80  Several states, including 
California, have subsequently pledged to implement the United States  
 
 75. SILVA & BARBOUR, supra note 62. 
 76. ARONSON & HILLEY, supra note 73, at 3. 
 77. LOWI & GINSBERG, supra note 66, at 49-59. 
 78. Id. at 51-53. 
 79. Id. at 49-59. 
 80. The federal government has, to date, created an 18% reduction of GHG intensity by 
2012, which is assessed to be close to a business-as-usual scenario.  See Guri Bang et al., 
Future United States Climate Policy:  International Re-engagement?, 6 INT’L STUD. PERSP., 
285, 291 (2005); see also Kathryn Harrison, The Road not Taken:  Climate Change Policy 
in Canada and the United States, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 92 (2007).  It is likely that cap and 
trade proposals will continue to be submitted to Congress in the coming years.  See Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).  
President Obama has announced that his administration will reengage with the UNFCCC.  
See Barackobama.com, http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/newenergy_more# 
emissions (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
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commitments under the Kyoto Protocol at the state level and have intro-
duced a variety of policy measures.81  They have adopted measures which 
have impacted both the national and the local level.  For example, the 2001 
California Climate Action Registry was the first of its kind to be estab-
lished, and has led to the creation of the Climate Registry which, as of 
January 2008, serves large parts of North America in supporting voluntary, 
market-based and regulatory GHG emissions reporting schemes.82 
In April 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued a final decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA83 holding that GHGs are considered air pollutants 
under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).  The decision, however, does not force 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate 
them, but it does limit the justifications the EPA may give for not doing 
so.84 
The federal government, through the EPA, holds the authority over the 
regulation of emissions from new vehicles and preempts states from adopt-
ing or enforcing standards, to avoid a lack of national uniformity.  Under 
the CAA regulations, however, California is the only authorized state to 
regulate vehicle emissions, while the rest of the states are free to adopt ei-
ther California’s or the federal standards.  California is the first state to en-
act a mandatory reduction of GHG emissions from vehicles through As-
sembly Bill 1493 (“AB1493”) and so far fifteen other states have adopted 
California’s AB1493 standards.  Unfortunately, AB1493 standards have 
not been implemented because federal regulatory requirements stand in the 
way.  In January 2008, California filed a lawsuit to reverse the EPA’s 
waiver denial of 2007, which concluded that state standards were intended 
to address local or regional pollution problems, not to address climate 
change emissions, because climate change is defined as a global issue and 
therefore does not pose compelling and extraordinary effects on California 
compared to the rest of the country.85 
California is regarded to have developed the most ambitious and com-
prehensive effort to mitigate climate change in the United States.86  In addi-
 
 81. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 82. See The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimateregistry.org (last visited Jan. 22, 
2009). 
 83. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 84. See generally ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SUPREME COURT’S CLI-
MATE CHANGE DECISION:  MASSACHUSETS V. EPA (2007). 
 85. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12156 
(2008). 
 86. See, e.g., Michael Hanemann, California’s New Greenhouse Gas Laws, 2 REV. 
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 114–29 (2008) (discussing California’s climate change initiatives). 
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tion to existing building and appliance codes,87 California has recently 
passed several important pieces of legislation.  In 2006, it passed the Cali-
fornia Global Warming Solutions Act,88 which, through an economy-wide 
regulatory program, mandates reductions in GHG emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020 (equalling a 25-30% reduction from current emission levels89).  
The act includes a package of policies to be put in place by state agencies.  
Governor Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order S-3-0590 of 2005 establishes 
a reduction of GHG emissions to 2000 levels by 2010, a reduction to 1990 
levels by 2020 and a reduction to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 
AB 1493, passed in 2002, has made California the first state to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles.91  It mandates that the Cali-
fornia Air Resources Board (“CARB”) develop and implement emission 
caps for vehicles beginning in model year 2009.92  California enacted 
passed legislation93 that requires that 20% of the electricity sold by inves-
tor-owned electric utilities in the state come from renewable sources by 
2010.94  It is currently under consideration to be strengthened further—
possibly to 33% by 2020.95  Senate Bill 1368 of 2006, the Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Performance Standard, requires the California Energy Commis-
sion (“CEC”) and the California Public Utilties Commision (“CPUC”) to 
set a GHG emissions standard for electricity used in California, regardless 
of whether it is generated in state or purchased from plants out of state.96  
All of these measures have had significant impacts between levels of Cali-
fornia’s government as well as across states. 
Similarly to California, other U.S. cities have adopted innovative meas-
ures to address climate change, both in climate-active and climate-inactive 
 
 87. See California’s Energy Efficiency Standards for Residential and Non Residential 
Buildings, http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
 88. Assem. B. 32, 2006 Assem., Reg. Ses.  (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.arb.ca. 
gov/cc/docs/ab32text.pdf. 
 89. Schroeder & Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change:  Los Angeles, supra note 3, at 4. 
 90. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (June 1, 2005), available at http://gov.ca.gov/executive-
order/1861/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009) (documenting environmental executive order given 
by the Governor of California). 
 91. Assem. B. 1493, 2002 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), available at http://www. 
climatechange.ca.gov/publications/legislation/ab_1493_bill_20020722_chaptered.pdf. 
 92. Id. § 3. 
 93. See S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). 
 94. Id. § 2.  The target year was initially 2017 and accelerated by the California Public 
Utilities Commission.  CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ENERGY ACTION PLAN II:  IMPLEMENTA-
TION ROADMAP FOR ENERGY POLICIES 6 (2005) [hereinafter CPUC:  IMPLEMENTATION], 
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/REPORT/51604.htm. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See S.B. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.leginfo. 
ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1368_bill_20060929_chaptered.pdf. 
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states.97  A noteworthy development has been the 2005 United States Con-
ference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement,98 which commits its cur-
rently over 700 signatories to take the following three actions: 
- Strive to meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol targets in their own communi-
ties, through actions ranging from anti-sprawl land-use policies to urban 
forest restoration projects to public information campaigns; 
- Urge their state governments, and the federal government, to enact poli-
cies and programs to meet or beat the greenhouse gas emission reduction 
target suggested for the United States in the Kyoto Protocol—7% reduc-
tion from 1990 levels by 2012; and 
- Urge the U.S. Congress to pass the bipartisan greenhouse gas reduction 
legislation, which would establish a national emission trading system.99 
Cities are not equal in terms of power structures.  There are three general 
forms of city government in the United States: the mayor-council, commis-
sion, and council-manager systems.100  The mayor-council form of gov-
ernment consists of a popularly elected mayor and a unicameral city coun-
cil made up of individuals who are either elected at-large or as 
representatives of districts within the city.101  Budgetary and personnel de-
cisions may be taken by either the mayor (“strong-mayor” system) or by 
the council (“weak-mayor” system).102  Los Angeles is an example of a 
“strong-mayor” system.103  In the commission form of city government, 
[e]ach commissioner serves as the administrative head of a city depart-
ment and collectively they are responsible for making policy decisions.  
[Finally,] [i]n the council-manager system, a city council is elected in at-
large elections.  The council then hires a city manager, who oversees the 
day-to-day administration of the city government.  In most cases, the 
council chooses from among its ranks someone to serve as mayor but 
without the [extent of mayoral] powers under the mayor-council form of 
government.104 
 
 97. Osofsky & Levit, Scale of Networks?, supra note 12, at 413. 
 98. See MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS CLIMATE PROTEC-
TION AGREEMENT (2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/ 
agreement.htm. 
 99. Id. 
 100. FORMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, A HANDBOOK ON CITY, COUNTY AND REGIONAL OP-
TIONS 6 (Roger L. Kemp ed., 1999). 
 101. See id. 
 102. BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 64. 
 103. See TERRY CHRISTENSEN & TOM HOGEN-ESCH, LOCAL POLITICS:  A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO GOVERNING AT THE GRASSROOTS 123 (M.E. Sharpe ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
 104. BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 64-65. 
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Metropolitan areas, such as the Los Angeles metropolitan area, are an 
important context in which city and county governments exist in the United 
States  They are not a formal political designation but rather a reflection of 
urban sprawl or the “suburbanization” of America.105  This mismatch of 
political and urban delimitation has led to a fragmentation of authority, 
making it difficult to manage problems such as traffic congestion or air and 
water pollution.106  Inner-cities are often faced with financial difficulties as 
people move to the suburbs, depriving the city government of its income 
from property taxes, while continuing to use the city’s basic services and 
infrastructures.107 
II.  CLIMATE POLICY AND ACTION IN LONDON 
This Part reviews the development of London’s climate change policy 
during the period from 2000 through 2008. 
A. London’s Socio-Economic and Environmental Profile 
London is the capital of the United Kingdom with a population of 7.7 
million, projected to reach 8.1 million by 2016.108  London’s economy con-
tributes 20% to U.K. GDP, with over a third of the workforce employed in 
the financial and business services sector.109  While it has witnessed strong 
economic growth, there are still areas of significant social and economic 
deprivation, with five of the ten most deprived local authorities situated in 
inner London.110  London’s emissions of greenhouse gases are substantial 
and similar to those of some European countries such as Greece or Portu-
gal.111  In 2006, excluding aviation, carbon dioxide emissions were 44Mt or 
8 % of the United Kingdom’s total.112  As shown in Figure 1, the predomi-
nant sources of London’s emissions of carbon dioxide are the domestic and 
commercial and public sectors. 
 
 105. Id.; CHRISTENSEN & HOGEN-ESCH, supra note 103, at 45-46. 
 106. BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 64-65. 
 107. Id. at 65. 
 108. OXFORD ECON. FORECASTING, LONDON’S PLACE IN THE U.K. ECONOMY, 2005-06, at 
41 (2005). 
 109. Id. at 6. 
 110. Id. at 38 
 111. LONDON CLIMATE CHANGE AGENCY, MOVING LONDON TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE 
LOW-CARBON CITY:  AN IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 1 (2007) [hereinafter LCCA, MOVING 
LONDON]. 
 112. GREATER LONDON AUTH., ACTION TODAY TO PROTECT TOMORROW:  THE MAYOR’S 
CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 16 (2007) [hereinafter GLA, ACTION TODAY]. 
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Figure 1:  London’s 2006 carbon dioxide emissions113  Note that exlcu-
ding aviation, domestic and commercial/public sector activities constitute 
the bulk of U.K. CO2 emissions. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, both domestic and commercial emissions of car-
bon dioxide are set to increase due to the predicted substantial population 
and building growth over the next two decades.  Excluding aviation, emis-
sions from transport are the third largest contributor, but have been stable, 
though an increase is also predicted in this area by 2025.  Industrial emis-
sions are set to decline still further from their 1990 baseline. 
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Figure 2:  London’s projected CO2 emissions for 2025—the business as 
usual scenario (excluding aviation)114 
B. Competencies and Powers for Climate Governance in London 
In terms of its administrative make-up, there are thirty-three local coun-
cils which make up the greater London area, several of whom have been 
pioneers in energy and climate change policy.115  In 2000, a new adminis-
trative structure for London, the Greater London Authority (“GLA”) was 
established, marking a “significant new step in the history of London gov-
ernment and plan-making.”116  Although London had previous experience 
of metropolitan wide government, notably with the Greater London Coun-
cil, the GLA is distinctive in its dual structure, comprised of a directly 
elected mayor and a separate, directly elected twenty-five member assem-
bly, with an administrative body of some 600 staff.  The mayor oversees 
the work and budgets of the GLA group, including Transport for London, 
 
 114. Id. at 17. 
 115. Joe Painter, Local Government and Governance, in THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF 
THE UK 296-314 (Vince Gardiner & Michael Hugh Matthews eds., 3rd ed. 2000). 
 116. Andy Thornley et al., Business Privilege and the Strategic Planning Agenda of the 
Greater London Authority, 42 URB. STUD. 1947, 1947 (2005). 
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the London Development Agency (LDA, one of nine regional development 
agencies in the United Kingdom), and the metropolitan police and fire ser-
vices.  In addition, the mayor is tasked with the development of statutory 
strategies on transport, housing, spatial planning, economic development, 
and the environment (including air quality, waste and biodiversity).117 
These roles and responsibilities carry with them specific opportunities 
for addressing climate change.  In the area of spatial planning, the mayor is 
responsible for the strategic development of the London metropolitan area 
through the London Plan.118  While the thirty-two borough councils in 
London retain responsibility for preparing Unitary Development Plans, 
which set out specific proposals and guidelines for particular areas, they 
must ensure that these “conform broadly” to the London Plan.119  In addi-
tion, the mayor must be consulted on planning applications that have poten-
tial strategic importance (for example, for housing that is over a certain 
threshold size or located in sensitive areas or major infrastructure) and can 
direct local borough councils to refuse planning permission to develop-
ments which are seen to be contrary to the London Plan.120  In terms of 
transport, the Mayor has considerable powers through the development of 
the integrated transport strategy, the use of congestion charging, and the 
ability to shape the provision of public transport services in London.  Under 
the powers of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Mayor of Lon-
don introduced a charging scheme in central London in February 2003.121  
Like other development agencies, the LDA is charged, alongside innova-
tion and economic development, with “contributing to security of supply” 
and “tackling climate change and contributing to other energy policy 
goals.”122  In the Greater London Authority Act 2007, the mayor was 
charged with the duty to “take action with a view to mitigation of, or adap-
tation to, climate change” in line with national government policy and with 
the responsibility for preparing detailed strategies for both mitigation and 
adaptation.123  This new duty places addressing climate change on a sub-
 
 117. See About the Greater London Authority, http://www.london.gov.uk/gla/index.jsp 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 118. See GREATER LONDON AUTH., THE LONDON PLAN:  SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT STRAT-
EGY FOR GREATER LONDON 3 (2004) [hereinafter GLA, THE LONDON PLAN], available at 
http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/strategies/sds/london_plan/lon_plan_all.pdf. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. LGA, CUTTING THROUGH THE GREEN TAPE, supra note 39, at 24. 
 122. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., MEETING THE ENERGY CHALLENGE—A WHITE PAPER ON 
ENERGY 13 (2007), available at www.berr.gov.uk/files/file39564.pdf. 
 123. Greater London Authority Act, 2007, ch. 24, §§ 41-44 (Eng.), available at http:// 
www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2007/pdf/ukpga_20070024_en.pdf. 
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stantive legal footing, one not witnessed in the United Kingdom’s other cit-
ies and regions. 
C. The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in London 
The impetus to address climate change within London came directly 
from then Mayor Ken Livingstone and his office.  During his first term, de-
spite the lack of a statutory remit to do so, Livingstone developed an En-
ergy Strategy for London124  which placed climate change center stage 
(Table 1).  Echoing the main tenets of national policy, this strategy held 
that “London should reduce its emissions of carbon dioxide by 20%, rela-
tive to the 1990 level, by 2010 as the crucial first step on a long-term path 
to a 60 per cent reduction from the 2000 level by 2050.”125  In order to pur-
sue this goal, two strategies were adopted.  First, the use of the mayor’s 
powers through the London Plan to promote the use of on-site renewable 
energy generation (micro-generation) and Combined Heat and Power 
(“CHP”).  Second, an emphasis on voluntary action through the formation 
of the London Energy Partnership, to assess the barriers and opportunities 
for energy efficiency and renewable energy in London.  Also in Living-
stone’s first term, two other partnerships were formed to address aspects of 
the climate change challenge: the London Climate Change Partnership126 
and the London Hydrogen Partnership.127  The focus on partnerships, as 
examined further below, was a testament to the relatively limited ability of 
the mayor and the GLA to have a significant impact on the ways in which 
energy is produced and used in London.  In addition, this period witnessed 
the introduction of the London Congestion Charge which, while having lit-
tle overall impact on greenhouse gas emissions, served to provide evidence 
that difficult policy measures could be implemented (Table 1).128  The pe-
riod from 2000 through 2004 can be summarized as one of experimentation 
with the formal powers of the mayor in relation to energy and transport pol-
icy, and the emergence of a partnership approach to climate governance in 
London. 
 
 124. GREATER LONDON AUTH., GREEN LIGHT TO CLEAN POWER:  THE MAYOR’S ENERGY 
STRATEGY (2004). 
 125. Id. at 55. 
 126. This partnership is focused on vulnerability and adaptation. 
 127. This partnership is concerned with research and development for new hydrogen 
technologies. 
 128. Georgina Santos & Blake Shaffer, Preliminary Results of the London Congestion 
Charging Scheme, 9 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 164-81 (2004). 
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Table 1: London’s climate policy milestones129 
Milestone Goal Approach 
2000 Greater Lon-
don Assembly and 
Mayor of London 
Strategic oversight of policy is-
sues affecting London.   
Directly elected mayor who appoints a team of 
policy advisors.  GLA members elected and 
operate with support of civil servants. 
2001 London Cli-
mate Change Part-
nership 
Assist London in preparing for 
the impacts of climate change by 
raising awareness, developing 
adaptation guidance, and improv-
ing the built environment. 
Stakeholder group of thirty key government 
and non-government organizations.  Commis-
sions research; develops guidelines; provides 
responses to national and local policy.   
2002 London Hy-
drogen Partnership  
Work towards establishing a hy-
drogen economy for London and 
the U.K. 
Stakeholder group supported by a secretariat 
and working groups.  Undertakes research; es-
tablishes demonstration projects; disseminates 
information.   
2003 London con-
gestion charge 
Reduce congestion and pollution 
in central London. 
A levy is charged on every motorist entering 
the Congestion Charge Zone in inner-London.   
2004 Energy Strat-
egy for London 
Reduce emissions of carbon di-
oxide by 20% below 1990 levels 
by 2010 as a first step to a reduc-
tion of 60% by 2050. 
Promotion of energy efficiency and renewable 
energy through mayor’s planning powers.  
Mandates the formation of the London Energy 
Partnership. 
2004 London En-
ergy Partnership 
Assist in the delivery of Lon-
don’s energy policy; provide a 
single voice for the sustainable 
energy community in London; 
create new business opportunities 
for sustainable energy. 
Building the knowledge base on the problems 
and opportunities for sustainable energy in 
London; Seeking to build capacity, training 
courses, knowledge sharing. 
2004 London Plan Provide planning guidance for 
large-scale projects and for plan-
ning policies for borough coun-
cils.   
Includes measures to promote the generation of 
10% of energy from renewable sources on-site 
for new developments. 
2004 Mayoral elec-
tions 
Mayor Ken Livingstone runs for 
a second term of office with cli-
mate change as a key policy issue 
and wins.   
Various pledges on climate policy included in 
manifesto. 
2005 London Cli-
mate Change 
Agency 
Deliver projects that reduce Lon-
don’s GHG emissions in the en-
ergy, waste, water, and transport 
Sectors. 
Established as a municipal company wholly 
owned and controlled by the London Develop-
ment Agency (“LDA”) with private and civil 
sector support.  Develops projects, addresses 
regulatory and technical issues, seeks to create 
markets for energy efficiency and renewable 
energy. 
2005 C40 Climate 
Leadership Group 
Promote urban leadership on 
climate change and establish 
cost-effective means of address-
ing the issue. 
Membership network of forty of the world’s 
“global” cities.  Exchange and transfer of best 
practices, project implementation, knowledge 
base development.  Partnership with the Clin-
ton Climate Initiative. 
2007 London Cli-
mate Change Action 
Plan 
Stabilize CO2 emissions in 2025 
at 60% below 1990 levels, with 
interim progress towards this 
goal. 
Change technical and regulatory aspects of en-
ergy infrastructures; promote changes in do-
mestic and commercial sector practice. 
 
 129. Bulkeley & Schroeder, Governing Climate Change:  London, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
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2007 The Greater 
London Authority 
Act 
Mainstream climate change 
within the policy framework of 
the mayor and the GLA. 
Impose a new duty on the mayor to prepare, 
publish, and implement climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation strategies.  
2008 Further Altera-
tions to the London 
Plan 
Provides strategic planning guid-
ance for large-scale projects and 
for planning policies for borough 
councils. 
Promote a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions 
from new developments through on-site renew-
able energy generation; prioritizes use of 
CCHP technologies before other forms of 
power generation. 
2008 Adaptation 
Strategy 
Protect and enhance the quality 
of life of Londoners; promote 
and facilitate the sustainable de-
velopment of London by prepar-
ing for the impacts of climate 
change and extreme weather. 
Identifies the key risks to London and London-
ers (heatwave, flood, drought) and prioritizes 
the actions necessary to manage those risks 
(taking a prevent-prepare-respond-recover ap-
proach). 
 
The second term of office for Ken Livingstone witnessed an important 
shift in the nature and direction of climate policy (Table 1).  As one inter-
viewee suggested, after having produced the Energy Strategy as a  “broad 
foundation for what one could do” Mayor Livingstone then “decided in the 
2004 election that this was going to be the biggest issue of the second may-
oral term, it was the thing that became a personal priority for the 
Mayor.”130  To that end, Livingstone’s 2004 manifesto included the com-
mitment to develop a Climate Change Agency for London, and a Climate 
Change Action Plan.131  In 2005, the London Climate Change Agency was 
established as “a municipal company wholly owned and controlled by the 
London Development Agency (“LDA”) and chaired by the Mayor” with 
private sector support from “BP, Lafarge, Legal & General, Sir Robert 
McAlpine, Johnson Matthey, and the City of London Corporation” and the 
support of “Rockefeller Brothers’ Trust, KPMG, Greenpeace, The Climate 
Group, the Carbon Trust and the Energy Savings Trust.”132  While there 
remains a focus on partnership, with the creation of the LCCA attention has 
turned to the delivery of climate policy.  The 2007 London Climate Change 
Action Plan stresses the means through which various policy initiatives, 
discussed in more detail below, will be delivered.  At the same time, de-
spite a recognition that the 20% goal for 2010 would not be reached, it es-
tablishes a more ambitious policy goal, such that the new target “is to stabi-
lize CO2 emissions in 2025 at 60% below 1990 levels, with steady progress 
towards this over the next twenty years.”133  Under the Greater London Au-
thority Act 2007, the mayor was given a “new statutory duty to contribute 
 
 130. Interview with Anonymous, in London, Eng. (Dec. 2007). 
 131. See Press Release, Greater London Auth., London’s Political and Business Leaders 
Come Together to Combat Climate Change (June 20, 2005), available at http:// 
www.london.gov.uk/view_press_release.jsp?releaseid=5234. 
 132. LCCA, MOVING LONDON, supra note 111, at 3. 
 133. GLA, ACTION TODAY, supra note 112, at 19. 
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towards the mitigation of, or adaptation to, climate change in the UK.”134  
As a result, the mayor is required to “produce statutory strategies for cli-
mate change mitigation and energy and for adaptation to climate change in 
London.”135  As the first city to do so, London published an elaborate adap-
tation strategy in August 2008.136  While some of the drivers and motiva-
tions may therefore change with the appointment of the new Conservative 
Party mayor, Boris Johnson, the legal requirement to address climate 
change at least provides a platform upon which to build future strategies.137 
Over the past eight years London has witnessed a steep change in politi-
cal will, policy attention, and project delivery for addressing climate 
change.  The drivers and motivations behind this are necessarily multiple 
and complex, and include the commitment of key individuals, the courage 
of conviction born in part from interim policy success, a positive climate of 
public opinion, a lack of overt opposition from key interest groups and the 
emergence of new market opportunities in the carbon economy.138 
D. Climate Governance in Action 
As London’s climate policy has evolved, so too have the goals, meas-
ures, and initiatives established to reduce GHG emissions.  One key issue 
has been the development of decentralized energy infrastructure, seen as a 
centerpiece of the 2007 Climate Change Action Plan: 
The Mayor’s top priority for reducing carbon emissions is to move as 
much of London as possible away from reliance on the national grid and 
on to local, lower-carbon energy supply (decentralised [sic] energy, in-
cluding combined cooling heat and power networks, energy from waste, 
and onsite renewable energy - such as solar panels) . . . The Mayor’s goal 
is to enable a quarter of London’s energy supply to be moved off the grid 
and on to local, decentralised [sic] systems by 2025, with more than half 
of London’s energy being supplied in this way by 2050.139 
Following the shifts in national planning guidance detailed above, and in 
the wake of the “Merton Rule”, the London Plan initially included the tar-
get that 10% of predicted energy demand for a new development should be 
 
 134. GLA, THE LONDON PLAN, supra note 118, at 195. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See GREATER LONDON AUTH., THE LONDON CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRAT-
EGY (2008), http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/publications/2008/docs/climate-change-
adapt-strat.pdf. 
 137. To date, Mayor Johnson has committed London to the target within the London 
Climate Change Action Plan and to the continued support of the C40 network. 
 138. Bulkeley & Schroeder, Governing Climate Change:  London, supra note 3, at 6. 
 139. GLA, ACTION TODAY, supra note 112, at 105. 
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met through on-site generation.140  Subsequent alterations to the London 
Plan in 2008 strengthened this approach such that new developments must 
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide by 20% through on-site renewable en-
ergy generation unless it can be “demonstrated that such provision is not 
feasible,”141  an important caveat introduced by business organizations who 
sought to challenge the presumption that emissions should be reduced on a 
site-by-site basis.  In pursuing the decentralization of energy provision, the 
London Climate Change Agency has developed an energy services com-
pany (“ESCO”)142: 
The London ESCO has been established to design, finance, build and op-
erate local decentralised [sic] energy systems for both new and existing 
developments.  It has been established as a private limited company with 
shareholdings jointly owned by the London Climate Change Agency Ltd 
(with a 19% shareholding) and EDF Energy (Projects) Ltd (with an 81% 
shareholding).143 
Through the London ESCO, the LDA and the mayor are therefore able 
to directly provide decentralized energy systems.  This has also served as a 
foil to the concerns of the development industry that the targets for decen-
tralized energy could not be met—the argument is made that the existence 
of ESCOs means that it is harder to make the argument that such provisions 
are not feasible.  There are, however, considerable challenges in making 
the vision of a decentralized energy future a reality in London.  Not least 
among these are the national regulatory context for energy supply and the 
limited price paid for energy fed back into the national grid from decentral-
ized generation.  Equally important has been resistance on the part of some 
business organizations to the provision of renewable energy on a site-by-
site basis, citing issues of economic and environmental inefficiency.  At the 
same time, it is unclear whether there is a market, either in the domestic or 
commercial sector, for decentralized energy systems, particularly those 
which provide community-based heating, while at the same time many de-
centralized energy systems, for example, biomass or waste to energy, re-
main relatively experimental. 
The other key arena in which climate change policy has been put into ac-
tion is with respect to the existing built environment.  In terms of action in 
the domestic sector, like many governments in the United Kingdom and 
 
 140. Themertonrule.org, http://www.themertonrule.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 141. GLA, THE LONDON PLAN, supra note 118, at 205. 
 142. See London Climate Change Agency, The London ESCO:  We’re Working Towards 
Cleaner Energy for London, http://www.lcca.co.uk/server.php?show=nav.005003 (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 143. LCCA, MOVING LONDON, supra note 111, at 6. 
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around the world, London has focused at least some of its attention on an 
education campaign to promote individual action to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases, DIY Planet Repairs.144  More innovative has been the 
development of the Green Homes Programme,145 in collaboration with the 
United Kingdom’s Energy Savings Trust.146  The intention behind this 
scheme has been to create a coherent package of information, give advice 
and provide grants directory for the public.  Another is to develop the sup-
ply chain for “greening” homes, while at the same time undertaking mar-
keting and face-to-face contact with those individuals seen as most likely to 
undertake changes within their own homes.  In addition, a Green Concierge 
Service (“GCS”), described as a “unique partnership for London,” has been 
developed by the mayor, the LDA and the services company, Ten.  For an 
annual fee of £199, individuals are provided with a home energy audit and 
concierge services to assist with the selection and implementation of any 
energy efficiency or renewable energy schemes that they may wish to pur-
sue.  Rather than simply enabling individuals, through offering advice, the 
GCS seeks to effect reductions of GHG emissions more directly through 
providing a specific service. 
In relation to corporate and public sector buildings, London’s approach 
under the LCCA Green Organizations program has been two-fold.  The 
Green500 scheme is a “carbon management service and a performance 
based awards scheme” aimed at the largest 500 organizations in London in 
which each member is “assigned a Carbon Mentor who will design a 
unique, holistic, carbon management plan,” and carbon reduction target.147  
The Better Buildings Partnership is a scheme that seeks to draw together 
London’s leading commercial property owners and tenants to overcome 
barriers to the retrofit of office buildings.148  Established by the LCCA and 
the City Corporation of London, current members include British Land, 
Grosvenor, and Land Securities.  At least one of the motivations behind the 
roll-out and adoption of such schemes is the E.U. Energy Performance in 
Buildings Directive, where buildings will be given energy performance la-
bels.  Equally important, however, was the rise of climate change on corpo-
rate social responsibility agendas.  As one interviewee put it, “it doesn’t ac-
 
 144. See DIY Planet Repairs, http://www.london.gov.uk/diy/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 145. See London.gov,  Green Homes Programme, http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/ 
environment/climate-change/greenhomes.jsp (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 146. See Energy Saving Trust, http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 23, 
2009). 
 147. See London: Green Organisations, http://www.londonclimatechange.co.uk/green 
organisations/making-it-happen/green500/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 148. See London Climate Change Agency, http://www.lcca.co.uk/server.php?show= 
nav.00500a (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
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tually matter whether a board believes in climate change, ‘cos climate 
change believes in them and they have no choice but to ensure that they are 
seen to be taking effective action on climate change.”149 
Such approaches, based primarily on enabling others to take action and 
change behavior, inevitably encounter a range of barriers.  One issue was 
that of the “skills gap” in relation to improving the energy efficiency of 
built environments.  While some action has identified skills shortages and 
provided training, notably by the London Energy Partnership and through 
the new Green Homes Programme,150 delivering change across a diverse 
set of supply chains with different training requirements remains challeng-
ing.  Equally significant is the material condition of London’s existing 
housing stock, which is older than the U.K. average and where it has been 
difficult to persuade the utilities to deliver their Energy Efficiency Com-
mitment spending because of the relative expense of achieving efficiency 
gains.  At the same time, while the current policy and financial landscape 
for the initiatives outlined above appears healthy (with £7 million and £1 
million allocated to the Green Homes and Green Organizations schemes 
respectively), they remain at the margins of policy in London and subject to 
the vagaries of political whim. 
III.  CLIMATE POLICY AND ACTION IN LOS ANGELES 
This Part reviews the development of Los Angeles’s climate change pol-
icy during the period from 2005 through 2008. 
A. Los Angeles’s Socio-Economic and Environmental Profile 
Los Angeles is the largest city in California and the second largest in the 
country with a population of 3.85 million.151  The city spans over 465 
square miles (1,204 square km)152 and has a relatively low population den-
sity of 7,828 inhabitants per km² (New York City’s is 26,343).153  As of 
2005, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area had a population of 17.8 mil-
 
 149. Interview with Anonymous, in London, England (Dec. 2007). 
 150. See London.gov, Green Homes Programmes, http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/ 
environment/climate-change/greenhomes.jsp (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 151. This is a 2006 estimate.  See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Los 
Angeles (city), California, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0644000.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 152. See Los Angeles Mapped, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/lamapped/lamapped-exhibit. 
html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 153. See SANDRA O’FLAHERTY ET AL., IS LOS ANGELES MORE CROWDED THAN NEW 
YORK? 6, http://lewis.sppsr.ucla.edu/GIScontest/OsgoogEtAl_LANYDensity_report.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
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lion.154  Because of the city’s sea and air ports, which are among the largest 
in the world, and Los Angeles’s size and continuing urban sprawl, air pol-
lution from transport has been a major environmental problem for the city 
during the last decades.155  Los Angeles is the most car-populated metropo-
lis in the world with one registered automobile for every 1.8 people.156  The 
scarcity of rainfall further exacerbates the problem as rain can clear smog 
to some extent. 
Los Angeles’s emissions of carbon dioxide amounted to some 51.6 mil-
lion metric tons in 2004, a third of which were municipal (including elec-
tricity use and generation, sea and air ports).157  Despite high emissions 
from transport due to Los Angeles’s urban sprawl, the city’s emissions are 
about two-thirds of the U.S. average.  This is mainly due to below-average 
emissions in the housing sector (heating and cooling) thanks to the region’s 
moderate climate, but also to California’s comparatively stringent building 
and appliance codes.  While the population of Los Angeles grew by about 
10% during the last fifteen years, per capita emissions decreased by around 
13% during this period.158 
B. Competencies and Powers for Climate Governance in Los Angeles 
The City of Los Angeles is governed by a mayor-council system with 
fifteen city council districts.159  It owns and operates its electric utility, the 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (“LADWP”), which is the 
largest publicly owned municipal utility in the United States.  The LADWP 
provides water and electricity to the entire population of Los Angeles.  It is 
a proprietary department, which means that it does not rely on taxpayer 
money.160  The city also owns its sea and air ports and manages their on-
the-ground operations.  The Boards of Directors of the LADWP and Los 
Angeles’s sea and air ports161 are selected by the mayor and confirmed by 
 
 154. See S. CAL. ASS’N OF GOV’TS, STATE OF THE REGION 2007, at 149 (2007), available 
at http://www.scag.ca.gov/publications/pdf/2006/SOTR06/SOTR06_MetroRegions.pdf. 
 155. See THE CITY OF L.A., GREEN LA:  AN ACTION PLAN TO LEAD THE NATION IN FIGHT-
ING GLOBAL WARMING 15 (2007) [hereinafter GREEN LA], available at http://www.lacity 
.org/ead/EADWeb-AQD/GreenLA_CAP_2007.pdf. 
 156. See Guide for Moving to Los Angeles, California, http://www.moveinandout.com/ 
city_guide_for_moving_to_los_angeles_california.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 157. GREEN LA, supra note 155, at 3. 
 158. Id. at 15. 
 159. See City of L.A., http://www.lacity.org/council.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 160. See L.A. Dep’t of Water and Power, http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp 
000508.jsp (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 161. They include Los Angeles International (“LAX”), LA/Ontario International 
(“ONT”), Van Nuys (“VNY”), LA/Palmdale Regional (“PMD”), and the Port of Los Ange-
les. 
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the fifteen-member City Council for a four-year term.  Some major sources 
of GHG emissions are therefore largely controlled by the mayor. 
Others, such as transport-related policies, are only marginally controlla-
ble by the city government and shared, in part, by the Los Angeles metro-
politan area.  While Los Angeles is able to address emissions from city-
controlled operations, such as its fleet, bus services, and on-the-ground op-
erations at its sea and air ports, it can only provide incentives to reduce 
road traffic.  These include such measures as introducing bus and carpool 
lanes on some highways.  Because roads and public transportation are 
shared among cities in the metropolitan area, the Los Angeles County Met-
ropolitan Transportation Authority, a public agency, is charged by the state 
of California to oversee regional transportation planning and public trans-
portation for the county of Los Angeles.162 
C. The Evolution of Climate Change Policy in Los Angeles 
The city has issued several climate change plans since 1995, but they 
were narrowly focused on corporate emissions, the city’s use of electricity 
to light its buildings, or the fuel used in its transportation fleets.163  During 
Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s campaign in 2005 he issued a Green Plan, 
the first mayoral candidate in Los Angeles to do so.164 While addressing 
the main environmental issues Los Angeles faces, including air pollution, 
water quality, industrial waste, and lack of green space, it did not explicitly 
address climate change.  Recognizing this gap, the mayor and his staff 
identified climate change specifically as a problem for Los Angeles upon 
taking office.165 
Four aspects turned climate change into a priority issue for the city.  
First, the mayor and his staff recognized that “everything was kind of re-
lated and that the kinds of strategies that we would consider to reduce the 
city’s greenhouse gas emissions were also things that would benefit us on 
all of the other environmental problems that Los Angeles faces.”166  A Re-
source Management Blueprint167 and a Renewable Energy Goal168 (Table 
 
 162. See L.A. County Metro Transp. Auth., About Us, http://www.metro.net/about_us/ 
default.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 163. Interview with Anonymous, in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2007). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See GRIEG SMITH, RENEW LOS ANGELES 5-23 (2006), available at 
http://www.lacity.org/COUNCIL/cd12/renewla/cd12renewla243139873_08142006.pdf. 
 168. See LADWP Board of Commissioners Moves to Accelerate Renewable Energy Goal 
to 20% by 2010, BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 21, 2005, available at http://findarticles.com/ 
p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2005_Dec_21/ai_n15955733. 
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2) were already in place.  Second, it was realized that climate change is a 
local and high-risk problem that will likely have significant adverse effects 
on Los Angeles.169  Third, interviewees reported that the mayor has ambi-
tions to run for the office of Governor of California.  Given California’s 
leadership position on climate change, it is suggested that developing a pro-
file as a leader on climate change would put him at an advantage during a 
possible run for the governor’s office.170  Fourth, early on in his tenure, the 
mayor was contacted by the City of London to become part of their C40 
network, providing opportunities to further raise his profile as a leader on 
climate change.171  While measures to mitigate climate change do not seem 
to have direct impacts within or across levels of governance, the mayor’s 
motivation seems to have been at least strengthened by action in other 
global cities and at the state level. 
In May 2007, the mayor’s office published an action plan, titled “Green 
LA: An Action Plan to Lead the Nation in Fighting Global Warming.”172  
The plan includes over fifty initiatives to reduce the city’s carbon foot-
print, incorporating several already established measures targeting air pol-
lution, water conservation and energy decentralization, as they are also re-
ducing GHG emissions.  It was put together with the help of the coalition 
Green LA (which differs from the city’s action plan, also called Green LA), 
consisting of over sixty environmental and community-based organizations 
focusing largely on climate change issues.173  Green LA was formed in 
2006 to address environmental issues in the city, a goal expressed in sev-
eral speeches over the course of Mayor Villaraigosa’s first year in office.174  
Green LA provides “environmental guidance and expertise to the City of 
Los Angeles in an exciting model of collaboration between decision-
makers and advocates, helping to inform City policies and programs.”175 
 
 
 
 
 169. Interview with Anonymous, in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2007). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See GREEN LA, supra note 155. 
 173. See GREEN LA, A GREEN LOS ANGELES:  RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CITY OF LOS 
ANGELES FROM GREEN LA 12 (2006) [hereinafter GREEN LA:  RECOMMENDATIONS], avail-
able at http://www.libertyhill.org/common/publications/Greenla/GREENLA_to_print.pdf. 
 174. See, e.g., Antonio R. Villaraigosa, Mayor of L.A., “City of Dreams”:  Remarks at 
Town Hall (Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.lacity.org/mayor/myrspeeches/mayor 
myrspeeches280948898_11092005.pdf. 
 175. GREEN LA:  RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 173, at 3. 
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Table 2:  Los Angeles’ climate policy milestones176 
Milestone Goal Approach 
May 1999 – 
LADWP Green Power for a 
Green LA Program 
Reach 10% of power from 
renewables. 
DWP customers have the option to directly 
purchase energy produced from renewable 
resources. 
June 2005 – 
RENEW LA, A Resource 
Management Blueprint 
Shift to resource recovery 
waste disposal system to 
recover 90% or more of 
waste by 2025. 
Twenty-year waste management strategy 
(2005-25); build seven conversion technol-
ogy plants to draw valuable materials (e.g.  
plastics) from trash to use in manufactur-
ing, and produce renewable energy/ 
December 2005 – 
LADWP Renewable Port-
folio Standard / Renewable 
Energy Goal 
Increase share of renew-
ables to 20% by 2010 and 
35% by 2030. 
Generate energy from wind, solar and land-
fills. 
July 2006 – 
Million Trees LA 
Plant one million new trees 
within the city limits. 
City-wide collaboration  to plant and pro-
vide long-term stewardship of one million 
trees. 
May 2007 – 
Green LA: An Action Plan 
to Lead the Nation In 
Fighting Global Warming 
Reduce city’s emissions by 
35% by 2030. 
Wide-spread municipal adoption of more 
efficient systems of water and waste man-
agement, enenergy production, and trans-
portation. 
April 2008 – 
Los Angeles Green Build-
ing Ordinance 
Require that all new pro-
jects greater than fifty units 
or 50,000 square feet show 
compliance with the LEED 
certified level. 
Provide incentives (e.g. expedite permit 
processing if LEED Silver designation is 
met);  improve interdepartmental coordina-
tion (through a Sustainability Team that 
reviews and revises green building policies 
and projects);  train staff in green building 
methods and policies and/or as LEED Ac-
credited Professionals) 
In preparation – 
Water and Wastewater In-
tegrated Resources Plan 
Decrease per capita water 
use by 20% to eliminate the 
electricity needed for water 
supply and wastewater dis-
charge. 
Adopt tiered water pricing, building code 
changes and other financial incentives;  
Adopt technical assistance programs for 
business and industry, large landscape irri-
gation efficiency programs, system infra-
structure maintenance, and continue ongo-
ing programs to educate communities, 
build involvement in conservation initia-
tives, and develop water-use awareness. 
On the ballot – 
Expansion of transit system 
Reduce emissions from 
transport sector 
Introduce a county-wide 0.5 % sales tax to 
fund transportation infrastructure im-
provements. 
 
The city’s Green LA action plan commits the city to reduce GHG emis-
sions by 35% of 1990 levels by 2030.  As mentioned above, the action plan 
is to some extent a repackaging and synthesis of already existing measures.  
For example, it includes a Renewable Energy Goal of 20% by 2010 and 
35% by 2030, adopted in December 2005, which should translate into a 
 
 176. Schroeder & Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change:  Los Angeles, supra note 3, at 5. 
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17.5% reduction of emissions by 2030.177  To coordinate the various ac-
tions promulgated under this plan, the mayor initially created a sustainable 
practices cabinet and later a climate action team, which includes members 
of each department.178 
The transport sector, which is responsible for around half of Los Ange-
les’ emissions, was left largely untouched by the Green LA action plan.  A 
major barrier was the cost of building a transit system comparable to other 
major cities around the world and the perception that the support base was 
not yet strong enough.  The investment required was estimated by inter-
viewees to be around $25 billion.  Funding for transit in California “goes to 
the CA Transport Commission, and their mission, along with that of CAL-
TRANS, is to build more roads.”179  While it is possible for cities in other 
states, such as Portland, Seattle, Denver, or Chicago, to share the financial 
burden of expanding public transit systems with the state, in California 
90% of the funds must be locally generated.180  A new county-wide sales 
tax of 0.5% was agreed to in the November 2008 elections to fund trans-
portation infrastructure improvements.181  Counties in California are able to 
place local option sales taxes before its voters, requiring a two-thirds ma-
jority of the vote.  The revenue, estimated at around $40 billion over thirty 
years, would currently include both transit and road improvements. 
D. Climate Governance in Action 
Los Angeles has, in the course of the last two to three years, established 
the basis for a comprehensive approach to addressing climate change 
within the city.  While some of the measures adopted address both the need 
to mitigate and to adapt to climate change,182 this research project focused 
primarily on policy and action in the area of mitigation.  A number of 
goals, measures, and initiatives have been put into place to reduce emis-
sions of greenhouse gases.  These focus on many but not all areas of emis-
 
 177. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2007).  The target initially went beyond 
the requirements under the 2005 California Renewable Energies Act, which required that 
20% of the electricity sold by investor-owned electric utilities in the state come from renew-
able sources by 2017.  See S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg.Sess. (Cal. 2006).  The target year was 
then accelerated to 2010 by the CPUC.  See CPUC:  IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 94.  It is 
currently under consideration to be strengthened further—possibly to 33% by 2020.  Id. 
 178. See CPUC:  IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 94 
 179. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2007). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., Measure R, http://www.metro.net/measurer/ 
default.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
 182. Above all, energy, measures addressed to water conservation, and security.  See 
Schroeder & Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change:  Los Angeles, supra note 3. 
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sions.  For example, cities cannot themselves regulate vehicle tailpipe 
emissions.  Energy supply in the United States is mostly regulated by state 
governments, except in the cases of cities which own their utilities, such as 
Los Angeles. 
One important cornerstone of Los Angeles’s climate change mitigation 
efforts is a reconfiguring urban infrastructure, including energy, water, and 
transit.183  Energy and water supply reconfigurations are being conducted 
by the LADWP: 
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power . . . is embarking on the 
most ambitious transformation of any utility in America.  In 2005, Mayor 
Villaraigosa challenged the department to accelerate plans to generate 
20% of its electricity from clean, renewable sources from 2017 to 2010.  
Since then, LADWP has more than doubled its portfolio of renewable en-
ergy by purchasing wind, solar, and geothermal power.184 
The LADWP is faced with the challenge that existing transmission lines 
cannot meet projected future energy demand at present, which are projected 
to increase by 43% over the next two decades.185  The LADWP is address-
ing this problem mainly in two ways.  First, it is raising electricity prices 
while introducing pricing structures to reward those who conserve energy, 
such as tiered, seasonal, and time-of-use pricing.186  Second, it is shifting 
its power mix away from coal, which currently accounts for about 60% of 
the power source, to renewable energy.187  The question of transmission 
lines to transport renewable energy is an unresolved problem.  Both these 
strategies respond to the desire of the LADWP governing board to reduce 
the environmental impact of its operations: 
One of our specific barriers to whether or not we can actually reach our 
greenhouse gas mandates is our ability to bring transmission, to develop 
adequate transmission to bring the green power in.  So we are working 
with various groups in the environmental community to see if we can fig-
ure out corridors or some other way that allows us to build transmission, 
address these concerns of conservation, and habitats, and even develop-
ments.188 
 
 183. See id. 
 184. GREEN LA, supra note 155, at 4. 
 185. Judy Pasternak, “Corridors” of Power Are Finding Resistance, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
24, 2008, at A8. 
 186. See Press Release, L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, LADWP Commissioners Approve 
New Water & Electric Rate Actions, LADWP News, Oct. 2, 2007, available at 
http://www.ladwpnews.com/go/doc/1475/176896/ 
 187. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2007). 
 188. Interview with LADWP Representative, L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2007). 
SCHROEDER_AUTHOR_APPROVAL 2/21/2009  3:30:44 PM 
348 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
The current emphasis is on the latter strategy:  shifting the city’s energy 
mix away from coal.  There is a sense that this is the more politically viable 
option, even if the significant challenge of building additional transmission 
lines remains unresolved.  The new pricing structures are too conservative 
to make a significant impact on GHG emissions.  The state law requirement 
that Californian utilities supply 20% of their energy from renewable 
sources by 2010189 is another reason why emphasis on shifting power sup-
ply is currently prioritized, even if it appears that several California-based 
utilities may not meet California’s renewable portfolio standard.  Given 
that some of the current solar and wind farm projects are based out-of-
state,190 the intricacies of federally regulated interstate commerce further 
complicate the situation.  An additional hurdle is that existing transmission 
lines cannot be used given the new projects’ locations and new transmis-
sion lines would have to pass through protected areas, where it becomes a 
question of relative gain between protecting nature and wildlife versus re-
ducing emissions through expanding renewable energy.191  Furthermore, 
the LADWP labor union and its protection of jobs in the traditional power 
infrastructure has made it difficult for the city to move ahead with its re-
structuring.192 
The LADWP also faces the challenge of securing water for a growing 
population in a geographic area where demand from other parts of the re-
gion is increasing and water resources are depleting.193  In addition, an in-
crease in droughts is expected to further exacerbate the situation.  For Los 
Angeles, water is a crucial issue in the context of climate change because 
water is imported into the city, which generates significant emissions of 
GHGs and negatively impacts habitat.  85% of water is imported from 
Northern and Eastern California (the Colorado River).  From Northern 
California, water is transported partly by a water lift over the Tehachapi 
Mountains, which constitutes a huge expenditure of energy.194  According 
to the California Energy Commission, about 19% of total electricity of all 
sectors combined is related to water, the biggest single source.195  20% of 
 
 189. S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). 
 190. See DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, CITY OF L.A., PLANNING TO MEET THE CHALLENGE 6 
(2007), available at www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/committee/c25/hearings/VI%20LADWP 
%20and%20SCPPAA%2003.26.07.ppt. 
 191. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2007). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Oct. 2007). 
 194. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2007). 
 195. See Martha Krebs, Deputy Dir. for Research & Dev., Cal. Energy Comm’n, Address 
at the Assembly Comm. on Water, Parks, & Wildlife, Water Related Energy Use in Califor-
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electricity in Los Angeles is expended merely on the transportation of wa-
ter into the city.196  Reducing the amount of imported water to Los Angeles 
would therefore have a noticeable effect on its emissions level. 
Previously, Los Angeles has successfully reduced its extraction of water 
through efficiency improvements and reuse when required to do so in re-
sponse to environmental harm at Mono Lake, in the Owens Valley system 
and in the Eastern Sierras.197  Currently, the Los Angeles action plan envis-
ages a decrease in per capita water consumption by 20% through water 
conservation and recycling, including capture and reuse of storm water.198 
Regarding transit, the city is developing several transit-oriented devel-
opments (“TODs”).199  While relatively successful in other cities such as 
Portland and Washington D.C., TODs in Los Angeles are facing a number 
of obstacles.  A study reported by the Los Angeles Times found that TODs 
are not yet reducing traffic, rather they seem to increase congestion at such 
developments as they attract others to their urban infrastructure (shops, for 
example).200  It was found that transit is not yet efficient and built out 
enough for a significant shift from vehicle use to public transport.  Jobs and 
schools are usually not close to transit lines, making it difficult for TOD 
residents to leave their cars behind.201 
Another key element of Los Angeles’s climate change policy is an em-
phasis on the need to change behavior, particularly with regard to energy 
and water use.  To “help Angelenos be ‘energy misers,’” as the Los Ange-
les action plan puts it,202 measures have been adopted ranging from cus-
tomer rebates and a fund to acquire energy savings to distribution of energy 
efficient refrigerators and compact fluorescent light bulbs.  In addition, the 
city requires that all new buildings exceeding 50,000 square feet or fifty-
plus units become LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental De-
sign) certified.203  As building stock turns over every eighty years in Los 
 
nia (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-999-2007 
-008/CEC-999-2007-008.PDF. 
 196. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2007). 
 197. Id. 
 198. GREEN LA, supra note 155, at 6. 
 199. Id. at 23. 
 200. Sharon Bernstein & Francisco Vara-Orta, Near the Rails but Still on the Road, L.A. 
TIMES, Jun. 30, 2007, at A-1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-transit 
30jun30,0,4693321.story?page=3. 
 201. Id. 
 202. GREEN LA, supra note 155, at 5. 
 203. LEED is a US Green Council award, covering five areas:  site; materials; energy ef-
ficiency; water consumption; and interior air quality.  See generally U.S. Green Bldg. Coun-
cil, http://www.usgbc.org/Displaypage.aspx?categoryID=19 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
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Angeles,204 targeting new builds will slowly yield emissions reduction re-
sults.  This is extremely short compared, for example, to the United King-
dom’s 1000 year building stock turnover.205  Importantly, for the housing 
sector, the Los Angeles Department of City Planning is developing a Green 
Building Program focusing on the nexus between transit and housing.  To 
this end, the department is developing a standard of sustainability for new 
building projects in the city, which it intends to regularly strengthen in ac-
cordance with technological development.206  Many interviewees have re-
ferred to the substantial cultural barrier around transit.  In the words of one: 
There have also been efforts around reducing Los Angeles’s carbon foot-
print by putting housing and jobs closer to transit and by increasing hous-
ing density in the past ten years.  Given the cultural barrier around con-
necting high-income, single-family districts to the public transportation 
grid, progress has been slow and the focus has been on creating residential 
units in commercial quarters and increasing density there.  This, however, 
also requires developing infrastructure (schools, etc.) to encourage fami-
lies to come into these areas.207 
Another impediment to building out Los Angeles’s public transportation 
system is, as one interviewee noted, that “Southern California disposes of 
an especially virulent dose of “NIMBYism”—not in my back yard attitude.  
There is a sense of entitlement among especially rich Americans where 
they feel they can act in their narrow self-interest if they want to.”208  One 
prominent example is that plans for building a new light rail line are being 
held up by one particular neighbourhood community because of the associ-
ated noise.209  Interviewees shared the impression that California-based 
businesses are generally more amenable to a culture of sustainability than 
companies coming in from out of state; this applies in particular to auto-
mobile companies.  Companies are said to have adapted to California’s 
more progressive stance: “[t]hey have learnt long ago that you don’t fight it 
but shape it the best way you can because they cannot pick up and move 
from California.”210 
 
 204. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2007). 
 205. See ENVTL. CHANGE INST., UNIV. OF OXFORD, REDUCING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT OF HOUSING (2006), available at http://www.rcep.org.uk/urban/report/eci-appe_ 
embodied_energy.pdf. 
 206. See City of L.A. Envtl. Affairs Dep’t, Los Angeles Green Building Program, http:// 
www.lacity.org/ead/EADWeb-Sustainable/green_building_program.htm (last visited Jan. 
23, 2009). 
 207. Interview with Anonymous, L.A., Cal. (Sept. 2007). 
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Business behavior is targeted through a number of initiatives including a 
green business certification scheme, incentives for the growth of local 
green businesses and identification and promotion of locations for green 
businesses.  Over fifty buildings are being designed to LEED standards in 
the private sector and forty-eight buildings in the public sector have already 
been completed.211  The response from businesses is mixed.  While there 
have been requests from members of the business community to the city to 
put in place codes and regulations on green buildings, there is also resis-
tance to such measures from other segments of the community.  As a com-
promise, measures have started low and are being strengthened over time to 
obtain the buy-in from a larger segment of commerce.212 
IV.  COMPARING LONDON AND LOS ANGELES:  MODES OF GOVERNING 
AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
We suggest that the development of urban climate change governance in 
London and Los Angeles is characterized by a plurality of modes of gov-
erning in which the role of law takes on different forms.  Drawing on 
Bulkeley and Kern,213 we suggest that four modes of governing climate 
change can be identified.  First, a self-governing mode relates to the capac-
ity of local government to shape its own activities, although this may be a 
result of impetus from other levels of government or other actors.214  Sec-
ond, control and compliance refers to the governing of climate change 
through the use of traditional forms of authority such as regulation and 
planning.215  This mode is particularly associated with legal instruments.  
Third, we identify governing by provision, in which emission reductions 
are achieved through the delivery of particular forms of service and re-
source.216  The final one is a mode of enabling, where governing takes 
place through facilitating, coordinating, and encouraging action through 
partnership with private and voluntary sector agencies, and in the form of 
various types of community engagement.217 
 
 211. Margot Roosevelt, Bid to Make Buildings Greener OK’d, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2007, at B-1. 
 212. Schroeder & Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change:  Los Angeles, supra note 3. 
 213. Bulkeley & Kern, Local Government, supra note 40. 
 214. Id. at 2244-45. 
 215. Id. at 2246-48. 
 216. Id. at 2245-46. 
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A. Self-Governing 
Historically, municipal action in response to climate change has pre-
dominantly been undertaken in a self-governing mode, where municipal 
authorities seek to improve energy efficiency in their own operations, in 
housing stocks and vehicle fleets, as well as to change the type of energy 
used, through, for example, building integrated renewable energy systems 
or by switching to LPG as a type of fuel.218  In the United Kingdom, the 
self-governing mode of climate response is in part a reflection of the 
changing agendas of what is required of local authorities from central gov-
ernment in relation to performance indicators.  In this manner, self-
governance is in part driven by requirements to comply with national stan-
dards, and therefore linked to the development of the framework of what 
local authorities are and are not allowed to do with respect to climate 
change.  For the most part, however, both in the United Kingdom  and 
elsewhere, self-governing responses to climate change have primarily been 
undertaken on a voluntary basis, driven by membership in transnational 
municipal networks where “getting your own house in order” is regarded as 
a critical step for municipal climate policy. 
Evidence of this “self-governing” mode is seen both in London and Los 
Angeles.  For example, in London emphasis has been on the development 
of iconic renewable energy generation projects to supply key government 
buildings.219  In Los Angeles, transport measures include converting city 
fleet and city refuse collection trucks, street sweepers, and buses of the 
Metropolitan Transport Authority (“MTA”) to alternative fuels.220  The 
city-owned Los Angeles World Airports (“LAWA”)  purchases 15% of its 
electrical power through the LADWP’s Green Power program and is meet-
ing green building specifications, improving recycling, using alternative 
fuel sources, and recycling water.221  In addition, the C40 network, of 
which both cities are a part, is seeking to develop a tool for auditing and 
measuring the performance of municipal governments in which addressing 
their own emissions will be a critical step.  It is not, however, the dominant 
response in either, if relatively significant in the case of Los Angeles. 
 
 218. Allman et al., supra note 40, at 277 fig.1; see also BULKELEY & BETSILL, CITIES AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 59-69; Bulkeley & Kern, Local Government, supra note 
40, at 2244. 
 219. GLA, THE LONDON PLAN, supra note 118. 
 220. Schroeder & Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change:  Los Angeles, supra note 3, 
tbl.2. 
 221. GREEN LA, supra note 155, at 6, 16, 24. 
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B. Control and Compliance 
The control and compliance mode of governing is perhaps that which is 
most closely related to the role of law in municipal climate governance.  
Here, municipalities use their powers to determine planning law, to regu-
late and sanction, and to promote activities that contribute to the reduction 
of GHG emissions.  In both London and Los Angeles, this mode of govern-
ing has been deployed most notably with respect to planning.  Through the 
provisions of the London Plan, in a context where increasing energy effi-
ciency standards are being set by central government and the E.U., the 
mayor has mandated the increased use of renewable and decentralized en-
ergy generation in new developments.222  Similarly in Los Angeles, the Los 
Angeles Green Building Ordinance requires that all new buildings exceed-
ing 50,000 square feet or fifty plus units show compliance with the United 
States Green Building Council’s LEED certified level.223  There is clearly 
significant scope for utilizing municipal government’s limited legal powers 
in the arena of new developments.  This will address, however, only a 
small fraction of the emissions generated in any one municipality given the 
small proportion of the built environment that new development usually 
comprises, especially if the regulation addresses only larger buildings as in 
the case of Los Angeles.  In addition, such approaches have met with sig-
nificant challenge, notably from the business community in London but 
also in Los Angeles, and it is far from clear what the provisions of both the 
London Plan and the Los Angeles Green Building Ordinance will mean in 
practice given the higher initial building cost of “green” buildings. 
The case studies suggest that in terms of seeking to change behavior, 
municipal governments in London and Los Angeles have limited powers 
and they have been reluctant to use those that they do have.  Despite the 
success of the congestion charge in London, in terms of reducing local air 
pollution and congestion, raising revenue for public transport and increas-
ing the use of alternative modes of travel, this mechanism has not yet been 
successfully explicitly used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.224  A 
proposal to change the basis of the congestion charge in order to take ac-
count of vehicle greenhouse gas emissions was made, but later dropped by 
 
 222. See discussion supra Part II. 
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incoming Mayor Boris Johnson.225  While the congestion charge may have 
made a marginal impact on the overall emissions of GHGs from transport 
in London through creating a modal shift, at present the area covered is too 
small to have any significant and long term impact on GHGs across the 
city.226  Interestingly, there is significant support from the business com-
munity for a more comprehensive system of road-user charging, in order to 
relieve congestion.227  Whether the GLA has both the power and the politi-
cal will to undertake such a strategy, which is seen to be publicly unpopu-
lar, remains to be seen. 
Los Angeles has been reluctant to do any more than address emissions 
from its city-owned fleet or operate car pool lanes on some of its highways, 
even though emissions from transport account for about half of Los Ange-
les’s GHG emissions.228  This omission can be explained culturally, given 
the strong sense among the general public of entitlement to, or aspiration 
for, single-family homes and multiple cars per household. 
These two cases suggest that the explicit role of law in municipal climate 
change responses remains confined primarily to the area of planning and 
new development, and that here considerable contestation is occurring over 
the rights and responsibilities of different actors with respect to reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases. 
C. Provision 
Up until the mid-1990s, many municipal authorities across Europe and 
elsewhere in the world owned their energy generation, water provision, and 
waste services.  In effect, they provided utilities for their communities.  In 
this manner, “local governments were able to control the nature of infra-
structure development and to influence practices of public consumption and 
waste in such a way as to limit emissions of greenhouse gases.”229  We 
term this means of governing climate change “provision”—the provision of 
infrastructures and services through which municipal governments are able 
to influence the practices of individuals and the trajectories of future devel-
opment.  With the rising tide of neoliberalism in the utilities sector, many 
such municipally owned companies were sold during the 1990s (indeed, 
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much earlier in the United Kingdom context), and as a result the direct pro-
vision of services has declined.230 
This was not the case in Los Angeles, where the municipal authority re-
tains ownership of its utility through the LADWP.  Los Angeles was there-
fore able to address energy supply through its Renewable Energy Goal of 
reaching a share in energy supply of 20% from renewables by 2010 and 
35% by 2030.231  The motivation behind this is to phase out long-term con-
tracts with coal-fired power plants in neighboring states and replace them 
with decentralized renewable energy projects in Southern California and 
neighboring states, covering solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal.  While 
advertised as a measure to address climate change, it also addresses other 
objectives, such as the need to meet increasing energy demand and possible 
future energy scarcity as well as an aging infrastructure problem.  Another 
example of provision in Los Angeles is its approach to waste management.  
Through investing in conversion technology plants, the city is aiming to in-
crease the share of waste recovery to use in manufacturing and to generate 
renewable energy.  In its city-owned sea and air ports, Los Angeles is 
greening on-the-ground operations through, for example, providing alterna-
tive marine power at its ports while docking and purchasing some 10% of 
green power, improving recycling and meeting green building specifica-
tions at its airports.  Further examples of governing by provision include 
the city’s “Water and Wastewater Integrated Resources Plan” to improve 
water, wastewater, and runoff management in the city as well as increasing 
open space through creating new parks, revitalizing the Los Angeles River 
as a naturalized river, and planting one million trees.232  These examples 
demonstrate that governing by provision is a key mode through which cli-
mate change is addressed in Los Angeles. 
In London, one interesting finding from this study is that, despite the 
formal ownership or provision of utility services, the “provision” mode of 
governance is still important, as two examples illustrate.  First, the estab-
lishment of the LCCA as a municipally owned company has enabled the 
creation of the London ESCO, through which the LCCA can directly pro-
vide energy services—albeit that these “services” are about how to manage 
and reduce energy use, rather than the production and delivery of raw en-
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ergy to businesses and homes.  Second, the GLA has sought to work in 
partnership with other organizations to deliver other forms of energy “ser-
vice” to individuals and businesses, for example, the energy “concierge 
service.”  Rather than being a traditional utility provider, municipal au-
thorities in London have sought to re-imagine what energy “services” en-
tail, and, in partnership with other organizations, supply them.  Such ven-
tures have either been done under the general powers which London has to 
address sustainability and well-being, or, in the case of the LCCA and 
ESCO, on the basis of protracted and complex negotiations over the legali-
ties involved.  Here, rather than acting as a facilitator, the legal standing of 
local governments may have impeded municipal action.  Having achieved a 
robust legal status, however, the LCCA is now partially insulated from the 
politics of climate policy in London, and may be on a sound footing to fur-
ther novel work on the provision of energy services.233 
In both cases, the “provision” mode of governance has been a key facet, 
which may not come as a surprise given that energy supply infrastructures 
determine the level urban greenhouse gas emissions significantly. 
D. Enabling 
At the heart of the debate on the changing nature of “local governance” 
has been the proposition that modes of provision and control are waning, 
while local authorities are increasingly involved in “enabling,” or steering, 
other actors, in the voluntary and private sectors and at the community 
level, to act for the public good.  An enabling mode of governing involves, 
for example, local governments in promotional activities, public-private 
partnerships, and the provision of financial incentives or subsidies to en-
courage action by other actors for particular policy ends.234  In the United 
Kingdom, this mode of governing is not only a response by local govern-
ments to their declining formal powers and competencies, a means of get-
ting things done when other channels are blocked, but is increasingly man-
dated by central government.235  Local governments are now legally 
obliged to work with other partners in the Local Strategic Partnership, to 
establish Local Area Agreements, and develop a sustainable community 
strategy.  Local governments also now “contract out” services, such as 
waste collection and disposal or home energy efficiency improvements, in 
ways that make “partnership” working inevitable.236  Therefore, while par-
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ticular instances or examples of enabling action in London or other United 
Kingdom cities may be spontaneous, or emerge from the private rather than 
the public partner involved, the current approach towards, and legal context 
for, local government in the United Kingdom makes “enabling” an every-
day reality for most local authorities.  In the United States, “enabling” 
modes of governance are often created through funding flows from grant-
in-aid schemes to enable the implementation of national goals set by the 
national government. 
The formation of public-private partnerships has been central for Lon-
don.  It established the London Climate Change Partnership (2001) among 
government and non-government organizations to assist London in prepar-
ing for the impacts of climate change through raising awareness, develop-
ing adaptation guidance, and improving the built environment.  The Lon-
don Hydrogen Partnership (2002) and London Energy Partnership (2004) 
followed, facilitating the establishment of a hydrogen economy for London 
and the United Kingdom and assisting in the delivery of London’s energy 
policy.  In addition, the C40 Climate Leadership Group (2005) was estab-
lished to promote urban leadership on climate change beyond London and 
the United Kingdom.237  In Los Angeles, while the creation of public-
private partnerships has not been as central a facet as in London, “ena-
bling” modes of governance have been employed in the promotion of a 
green economic sector, such as through identification and promotion of lo-
cations for green businesses, collaboration with the private sector to offer 
effective incentives for the growth of local green businesses, and a certifi-
cation scheme for green businesses.238 
Given the limitations of power in the local government context and the 
extent to which GHG emissions are linked to urban lifestyles and economic 
activity, governing by “enabling,” promoting, or steering is used to increase 
the involvement of actors who would otherwise not be easily reached. 
E. Summary 
While all modes of governance identified play a certain role in the over-
all approach to reducing GHG emissions at the local level, the examination 
of the two cases of London and Los Angeles makes a number of important 
discoveries in their relative importance and how they relate to the role of 
law.  First, the direct use of legal instruments by municipal authorities to 
govern climate change in London and Los Angeles is limited, but it still 
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plays a critical role especially in relation to planning and new develop-
ment.239  Second, legal frameworks adopted at other levels of government 
are important in shaping the possibilities for local action.  Some legal 
frameworks provide an enabling context of multilevel governance, such as 
green building codes in the United States or the E.U. Energy Performance 
of Buildings in the United Kingdom.240  Other frameworks are more neu-
tral, such as the new requirements for United Kingdom local authorities to 
develop local area agreements, which may lead to new local responses.241  
Yet others create a constraining multilevel governance context, such as en-
ergy market regulation.242  Third, as municipalities seek to move within 
and beyond these frameworks, we can see that new modes of governing 
through provision and through enabling are becoming ever more impor-
tant.243 
CONCLUSION 
The cases of London and Los Angeles demonstrate that while both cities 
have adopted ambitious plans addressing climate change mitigation with 
targets and timetables going beyond any action at the national level, their 
limitation to perform climate change policy is somewhat determined by le-
gal frameworks at national or state levels.244  For example, emissions from 
the housing sector are addressed only to the extent of new developments 
and already established energy standards, such as LEED in the United 
States or Title 24 in California.  The existing housing stock is ignored for 
now, effectively leaving untouched the bulk of emissions from the housing 
sector, as this would require measures at national or state levels.  Control 
and compliance modes of governance are used where legal frameworks al-
ready exist, such as energy efficiency standards set by the United Kingdom 
government and the E.U. or the Los Angeles New Building Ordinance re-
quiring compliance with nationally-recognised LEED certified levels of 
energy efficiency in buildings.  They remain contested by local business 
communities because the associated extra costs.  An exception to this, and 
an example of municipal entrepreneurship using a control and compliance 
measure, is the London congestion charge, hailed as largely successful.  It 
was introduced to reduce local air pollution and congestion, but also re-
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duced carbon dioxide emissions, if only marginally.  It is now copied in 
other parts of the world.245 
Self-governance has been important in the initial stages of municipal 
climate policy.  Measures addressing municipal emissions have been driven 
largely by membership in transnational municipal networks and schemes 
measuring the performance of municipal governments in addressing their 
own emissions.  Acting as role model and voluntarily limiting city govern-
ment emissions has been important for generating acceptance among local 
businesses and citizens of measures to mitigate climate change.  Examples 
include renewable energy generation for government buildings in London 
and public transport and on-the-ground operations at city-owned sea ports 
and airports in Los Angeles.246 
Provision and enabling modes of governance in the local context have 
been the key tenets of municipal climate change governance.  It has been 
especially important to involve local stakeholders and build a local support 
base in developing context-specific solutions, which more often than not 
address multiple issues at the same time.  The various partnerships created 
in London are examples of this, as is the emphasis on the business sector in 
Los Angeles.  Providing decentralized and renewable energy infrastructures 
and services has been central in both cities.  While Los Angeles is fortunate 
to own the utility that services the entire city, London has created a com-
pany to provide energy-related services.247 
Given the gaps in action among the different levels of government, the 
role of law has been limited in urban climate governance to date.  Emphasis 
has remained on governance by providing new energy infrastructure and 
enabling public-private partnerships to emerge that provide services that 
help reduce urban emissions.248  This is not likely to change without na-
tional and international levels adopting control and compliance measures 
addressing climate change.  While climate change policies at the city level 
oftentimes encompass co-benefits, such as reductions in air pollution or job 
creation, and therefore make it attractive for municipalities to move into 
this policy arena, national governments and the international climate nego-
tiations seem somewhat more hesitant to move in this direction. 
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